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SUMMARY: THE PROTECTION OF WATER DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
Water has been used for military purposes in the past and still continues today, i.e. 
poisoning of enemy water, attacking enemy water ii:istallations, etc. This conduct· denies 
access to water, affects the supply of water, health, supply of electricity, etc. 
Public international law, such as treaties (e.g. The 1949 Geneva Conventions), customary 
international law, etc, regulate the protection of water during armed conflict. 
Chapter I of the dissertation analizes the public international law iro the abovementioned. 
The application of public international law, depends on the municipal law of the state 
concerned. This municipal law is, in the case of South Africa, found in the 1996 
Constitution. 
The 1996 Constitution contains specific provisions regarding inter a/ia the legal obligations 
of the South African security services, the legal status of international agreements, as well 
as the application of customary international law and international law. 
Chapter II of the dissertation analizes the abovementioned wrt the legal obligations of the 
SA National Defence Force iro the subject matter. 
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THE PROTECTION OF WATER DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
INTRODUCTION 
"As a result of war, you are thirsty; yesterday you took the water supply for granted, but today 
it is no longer possible to tum on a tap and drink. The water infrastructure where you live was 
damaged during the fighting. 
You have walked for days to escape violence unleashed in your own country. Terrified and 
tired, you cannot carry the water necessary to sustain you on this endless journey. 
Water supplies are frequently compromised in times of conflict. For those who stay and those 
who flee, water is the first priority for survival. "1 
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Water has been used for military purposes since time immemorial and this hostile use 
continues today.2 The availability of water often proved decisive when a site was chosen 
for a city, fortress or encampment. The remains of the great ancient civilizations clearly 
indicate that water-based constructions could be used against enemy troops and there was 
a definite military advantage to be gained by flooding the fortifications of besieged towns, 
or poisoning the water resources of the enemy. 
Modem examples abound. The British damaged the major German dams during the 
bombing runs of 1943. During the Korean and Vietnam3 wars, dams and dykes were not 
spared by bombs.4 In Afghanistan, the traditional irrigation system was brought to a 
standstill in the early years of the conflict. During the Gulf war, the allied bombing raids put 
Iraq hydroelectric power stations out of action. In January 1993, the Peruca dam in Croatia 
was seriously damaged by the Serbian militia. 
In modern armed conflict, even if the general prohibition under international law on the use 
of poison is complied with, water could still be contaminated as a direct result of military 
operations against water installations and works. 
In some situations, the party with control over water resources has the upper hand. 
Gaining that control thus becomes a definite strategy in, for example, cases of occupation 
1 ICRC (1994) 2. 
2 1CRC (1998) 32. 
3 Centner (1995) 17. Conventional bombs were used by the Americans to alter inter aHa river courses, since the 
Vietcong floated supplies down rivers in sealed 55-gallon drums. 
4 Centner (1995) 14. To hinder the Japanese lmperila Army's advance into Manchuria, defending Chinese 
forces under Chiang Kai-Shek dynamited the Huayankow dyke across the Yello River, inundating an area twice 
the size of Massachusetts. The action resulted in the drowning of several thousand Japanese soldiers and 
halted the advance of the Imperial Army in the region. However, approximately 250,000 to one million Chinese 
citizens also perished, and the dyke remained damaged until 1947. Ex~rts rate the Huayankow dyke 
destruction as the single most deadly act in all human history. 
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and internal conflicts.5 An occupying power may, for instance, expropriate land, thus 
swallowing up springs and wells, may totally or partially prohibit the people in the occupied 
territories from irrigating land, from using the water sources and watercourses to grow crops 
or run or develop their holdings as going concerns; and may impose pumping quotas. All 
of these do not affect only the population, but also the crops and livestock. 
In civil wars, which today account for most of the armed conflicts in the world, the use of 
water by the belligerent parties constitutes a serious threat to the population concerned. 
For example, the effect of destroying or rendering useless a source of drinking water or a 
safe water supply can in very short order deprive the local population of an essential 
commodity. In the case of a population in an arid region, it is easy to imagine what the 
outcome would be, for example, in several African countries or regions where water is a 
very scarce commodity. 
While thirst may sap the morale of troops on the battlefield, the lack of a safe water supply 
may force a population into exile and condemn crops and livestock to wither and die. 
EFFECT OF HOSTILITIES ON WATER 
To attack water is to attack an entire way of life. Even when water is available, military 
operations make access to it no easy matter, because hostilities between the parties could 
have the following effect on the supply and quality of water: 
a. The denial of access to water.6 In this instance for example, civilians are 
physically prohibited from gaining access to water, for instance when paths 
leading to water installations or supplies are mined, or where civilians are 
targeted whilst queuing at public water-collection points. 
Humanitarian workers are denied access to water installations to perform 
repair work. The repair and restoration of water installations, works and 
facilities require complex operations which involve bringing together the 
necessary technical expertise, equipment and manpower. 
b. Effects on the supply and quality of water.7 In times of conflict, water 
supplies may be affected in many ways. Installations and piping may be 
directly attacked by artillery fire or damaged as a result of indiscriminate 
shelling. Damage to power distribution can also jeopardise water SLfpplies. 8 
5 ICRC (1998) 33. Centner (1995) 102. In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the peace treaty with 
Israel, but stated, "The only matter that coukJ take Egypt to war again is water". In 1980 he went further by 
directly threatening Egypt's neighbour when he stated, "If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile 
waters, there wUI be no alternative for us but to use force". In 1990 the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
declared, • That the national security of Egypt is a ... question of water." 
6 ICRC (1998) 33. 
7 ICRC {1994) 4. 
8 In Iraq, most of the important power stations were targeted in the very first days of the Gulf war. 
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Crippling strikes against the abovementioned installations cut off electricity 
and prevent pumps and treatment stations running. Fuel is usually 
extremely scarce in wartime, so back-up . generators are rapidly rendered 
useless. Spare parts are looted or become unavailable due to embargoes or 
sieges. Repair and maintenance become impossible if the skilled personnel 
who operate and maintain large and complicated water installations leave or 
have to participate in the hostilities. 
c. Urban complexity.9 Warfare tends increasingly to occur in urban 
environments.16 Water infrastructures in modem cities are particularly 
vulnerable to attack or disruption, owing to their complexity. Cities are 
especially vulnerable when their water sources are distant. 
People everywhere need water for drinking, cooking, washing, but in the 
urban areas, the disruption of water distribution has particularly dramatic 
consequences, such as no supply of drinking water, no waste removal, etc. 
d. Effects on the civilian population.11 Once their water supply is threatened 
or compromised, people are compelled to leave the safety of their homes to 
seek water. This may mean that they fall prey to the hostilities taking place, 
such as bombardment, gunfire or snipers as they queue to collect water. 
The pressure on available water supplies becomes intense. Water supplies 
rapidly become overused and may become saline if situated near the sea. 
Under this pressure, and because water is so vital to human survival, 
violence and power struggles may break out within local communities over 
access to water supplies. 
e. Agriculture.12 In many parts of the world, irrigation systems are used 
extensively in agriculture. Destruction of irrigation systems, whether 
accidental or deliberate, deprives people of the means to grow their crops. 
This leads to malnutrition, starvation and disease. 
f. Health.13 In any water distribution system, leaks occur. However, additional 
damage to the infrastructure causes the water pressure to drop and become 
intermittent; as a result, dirty, unsanitary water tends to get sucked into the 
pipes through leaks. 
9 ICRC (1994) 4. 
10 It is estimated that by the year 2000, 40% of the world's population will be IMng in the cities. 
11 ICRC (1994) 5. 
12 ICRC (1994) 5. 
13 1CRC (1994) 6-7. 
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Inevitably, sewage pipes are often broken. As people continue to use their 
toilets, raw sewage flows into the streets, rivers and watermains. People's 
health becomes increasingly threatened as the conditions become more and 
more conducive to the spread of epidemic diseases. Problems of waste 
disposal and personal hygiene build up, while the high density of the 
population encourages the spread of disease. 
Water-borne diseases are also systematic killers amongst displaced people 
who have no access to a regular supply of clean water.14 When sanitation 
systems deteriorate, cholera and other water-borne qiseases can be 
transmitted rapidly to others. The large number of people and poor medical 
services found in certain conflict situations increase the potential for 
epidemics. When there is not enough water for people to wash properly and 
regularly, there is often a significant increase in parasites such as lice and 
fleas. These insects are potential carriers of serious diseases such as 
typhus and plague. 
Eye infections and skin diseases such as scabies become prevalent when 
the general hygiene of the population deteriorates. Water-borne and skin 
diseases compound the misery of war and have long-term implications for 
the health of the population once the war is over.15 
g. No electricity, therefore no water. 16 When armed conflict breaks out, 
power stations are often put out of action. The high tension power lines are 
also very vulnerable to bombardment and sabotage. Emergency generators 
moreover need diesel and this is likely to be in short supply or severely 
rationed in view of its strategic importance.17 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WATER DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
Introduction. Water can be seen as link between the traditional and new branches of 
public international law. Traditionally, armed conflict, whether of international or internal 
nature, is governed by international humanitarian law, or nowadays commonly referred to 
as the "Law of Armed Conflicf ('LOAC"), which is one of the oldest branches of public 
international law having its roots in both treaties and custom. 18 These laws and customs 
have arisen from the long-standing practices of belligerents; their history goes back to the 
Middle Ages when the influence of Christianity and of the spirit of chivalry of that epoch 
combined to restrict the excesses of belligerents. Since the nineteenth century, the 
14 It has been reported that up to 50% of deaths among displaced populations are caused by water-borne 
diseases. 
15 For instance, in Iraq, the incidence of water-borne diseases -and related deaths - is up to three times higher 
than before the Gulf war. 
16 ICRC (1995) 36; 38. 
17 Mostar, Sarajevo, Aden, Monrovia, Mogadishu, Kigali and Cosovo are just a few examples. 
18 Rogers (1996) 1; Kalshoven (1987) 7. 
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majority of the rules have ceased to be customary and are to be found in treaties and 
conventions.19 
The rules governing protection of water during armed conflict are mainly derived from the 
LOAC. In order to understand these principles, one should have a clear understanding of 
what the LOAC is, its purpose, sources, when it applies, etc. 
What is the LOAC? 20 The LOAC forms a major part of public international law and 
comprises the rules which, in time of armed conflict, seek to protect persons who are not, or 
who are no longer taking part in the hostilities, and to restrict the methods and means of 
warfare employed. In this sense, the LOAC aims to:21 
a. spare those who do not, or no longer directly participate in hostilities; 
b. limit the violence to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict, 
which can be - independently of the causes fought for - only to weaken the 
military potential of the enemy. 
These rules are international treaties or customary rules specially intended to resolve 
matters of humanitarian concern arising directly from armed conflicts, whether of an 
international or non-international nature. For humanitarian reasons, these rules restrict the 
right of the parties to a conflict to use the method or means of warfare of their choice, and 
protect persons and property affected or liable to be affected by the conflict. 
The ius ad bellum vs ius in bello. 22 The purpose of the LOAC is to limit the suffering 
caused by armed conflict by protecting and assisting its victims as far as possible. The law 
therefore addresses the reality of a conflict without considering the reasons for. or Jegalitv 
of resorting to force (my emphasis). It regulates only those aspects of the conflict which 
are of humanitarian concern. This is known as the ius in bello. 
The ius ad bellum on the other hand, regulates the legal principles regulating the right of 
states or groups of states to resort to the use of force. 23 These rules mainly derive from the 
1945 United Nations Charter, as well as customary international law. For purposes of our 
discussion, the main focus is on the ius in bello and not on the ius ad bellum. 
Geneva Law and Hague Law. 24 The LOAC has two separate branches, namely Geneva 
Law and Hague Law. 
19 Starke (1989) 552. 
20 ICRC (1998.1) 4. 
21 Sassoli eta/ (1999) 67. 
22 1CRC (1998.1) 16. 
23 Dixon (1999) 277-306; Dugard (2000) 412- 430; Starke (1989) 534- 540; Booysen (1989) 504-511. 
24 ICRC (1998) 4; Dugard (2000) 432-435. 
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a. Geneva Law. The Geneva Law is designed to safeguard military personnel 
who are not, or are no longer taking part in the hostilities, as well as persons 
not actively taking part in hostilities, such as civilians. 25 There are four 
distinct Geneva Conventions: 
(1) Geneva Convention I (Amelioration of the condition of the 
wounded and sick of armed forces in the field}; 
(2) Geneva Convention II (Amelioration of the condition of the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at 
sea); 
(3) Geneva Convention Ill (Treatment of prisoners of war); 
(4) Geneva Convention IV (Protection of civilian persons in time 
of war). 
The two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (hereinafter 
referred to as "Additional Protocol r and "Additional Protocol II'), strengthen the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts, 26 as well as offering protection 
to victims of non-international armed conflicts. 27 
b. The Hague Law. The Hague Law establishes the rights and obligations of 
belligerents in the conduct of military operations, and limits the use of certain 
means and methods of warfare. 
Geneva law and Hague Jaw are complementary. There are also other sources of the 
LOAC, 28 but for purposes of our discussion, these will not be considered. 
25 In The Geneva Conventions of August 1949, (Preliminary Remarks), it is stated on p 1 with reference to the 
four Conventions: 
• Each of these fundamental international agreements is inspired by respect for human personality and dignity; 
together, they establish the principle of disinterested aid to all victims of war without discrimination - to all those 
who, whether through wounds, capture or shipwreck, are no longer enemies but merely suffering and 
defenceless human beings. • · 
26 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
27 1977 Additional Protocol II. 
28 Suc::h as the 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg (prohibiting the use of certain projectiles in wartime); 1925 
Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of 
bacteriological methods; 1976 Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques (ENMOD Convention); 1980 Convention on prohibitions or restrictions 
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects; 1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use 
of chemical weapons and on their destruction; 1995 Protocol relating to blinding laser weapons; 1996 Revised 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps, and other devices; 1997 Convention 
on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their 
destruction; 1998 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court. 
7 
Prior to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, no specific, direct protection 
was afforded to the environment or the protection of water during hostilities in either 
Geneva or Hague law. The only customary LOAC rule which has developed directly 
relating to the protection of water, was the prohibition on warring parties from poisoning the 
water supplies of the opposing party. However, certain other LOAC customary rules 
affording indirect protection to civilians, civilian objects, and civilian objects indispensable to 
the survival of civilians, have also developed. 
Since the 1970s, the steady deterioration of the natural environment has given rise to 
widespread awareness of man's destructive impact on nature. International environmental 
concerns have led to the adoption of a large body of laws and rules for the protection and 
preservation of the natural environment. These efforts have resulted in the adoption of a 
substantial and constantly growing body of rules, known as "international environmental 
Jaw''. 29 According to Beukes, 30 international environmental law is the part of international 
Jaw that deals with the conservation and/or management of the environment and the 
control of environmental pollution. 
However, the problem is that most of these rules apply only in peacetime situations and the 
rules regulating the LOAC unfortunately did not develop so rapidly. It is a fact that the 
trends that shape legal rules applicable in peacetime often influence the development of 
the LOAC, in view of the extremely serious environmental damage caused by certain 
methods and means of modem warfare. 
Environmental protection was later raised in the more specific context of international 
human rights law, especially after the severe consequences of environmental warfare were 
witnessed, for example, during the Vietnam and Gulf wars. It is now recognized that 
personal growth and happiness - fundamental human rights - cannot be achieved in a 
severely damaged environment. The right to a healthy natural environment is thus gaining 
increasingly wide acceptance as a fundamental human right and it iS exPress!~ provided for 
in many international legal instruments31 and the constitutions of many states. 2 
29 Such as "The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment" which was adopted 
in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972 during the world-wide United Nations Conference on the Human Environment; 
"The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21", adopted during the Earth Summit held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
30 Beukes (1996) 102. 
31 Shelton (1991) n 4 at 103- 104. 
32 Shelton (1991) n 5 at 104. According to Shelton, at least forty-four national constitutions as well as some 
twenty state constitutions contain provisions concerning environmental rights and duties. Furthermore, 
virtually every constitution revised or adopted since 1960 has addressed environmental issues. 
LOAC PRINCIPLES. APPLICATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The LOAC has certain essential rules which always apply in the event of ~rmed conflict.33 
Some of the most important rules are: 
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a. Persons who do not, or can no longer participate in hostilities are entitled to 
respect for their life and their physical and mental integrity. Such persons 
must in all circumstances be protected and treated with humanity, without 
any unfavourable distinction whatsoever. These persons may not be 
tortured and must be provided with basic necessities such as food, clothing, 
water, etc. 
b. The wounded and sick must be collected and cared for by the party to the 
conflict which has them in its power. Medical personnel and medical 
establishments, transport and equipment must be spared. The red cross or 
red crescent on a white background is the sign protecting such persons and 
objects and must be respected. Red cross and medical personnel for 
example, must be allowed to carry out their humanitarian tasks, such as 
rendering medical support to the sick and injured, be able to execute repair 
work to objects and installations which are indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population, such as water installations, etc. 
c. Captured combatants and civilians who find themselves under the authority 
of the opposing party are entitled to respect for their life, dignity, personal 
rights and their political, religious and other convictions. They must be 
protected against all acts of violence or reprisal. These persons may not be 
tortured and must be provided with basic necessities such as food, clothing, 
water, etc. 
d. Neither the parties to the conflict, nor members of their armed forces have 
an unlimited right to choose methods and means of warfare. It is forbidden 
to use weapons or methods of warfare that are likely to cause unnecessary 
losses or excessive suffering. This is of particular interest to the protection 
of water, since attacks against dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations 
are forbidden, unless they regularly, directly and significantly support military 
operations.34 However, even then, a military commander is still under an 
obligation to consider the principle of proportionality, which means that the 
outcome of the attack/s must be in proportion to the military advantage which 
is to be gained. 35 In this instance the possible collateral effects of the 
33 ICRC (1998) 6; Starke (1989) 553. 
34 Article 56 (1) & (2) of Additional Protocol I. 
35 Article 57 of Protocol prescribes certain peremptory measures to be taken by those who plan or decide upon 
attack, inter alia: 
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planned attack/s must be taken into consideration, for example that 
thousands of civilians may be drowned if a dam walt is destroyed. 
e. The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and civilian property. Neither the civilian population as a whole 
nor individual civilians may be attacked. Attacks may be solely against 
military objectives, with the proviso as stated in paragraph d above. This 
rule is of specific importance to the protection of water during armed conflict, 
because Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions specifically forbids attacks 
against civilian objects36 or objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population, such as drinking water installations and supplies and 
irrigation works, 37 unless certain conditions apply.38 
WHEN DOES THE LOAC APPLY? 
The LOAC applies in two situations,39 namely: 
a. International armed conflicts. 40 In such situations the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I apply. The LOAC is intended in principle to apply 
to the parties to the conflict and protects every individual or category of 
individuals not, or no longer actively involved in the conflict. 
a. Article 57(2)(iiil: "refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relations to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated;" and 
b. Article 57(2)(b): "an attack shall be canoe/led or suspended if it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civHians, damage to civilian objects, or 
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated;" 
36 Article 52 (1) of 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
37 Article 54(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I 
38 Article 54(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I states that these prohibitions shall not apply to the objects referred 
to when used by an adverse party: 
"(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or 
(b) if not as sustenance, then in dN"ect support of military action, provided, however, that in no 
event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian 
population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its 
movement." 
39 1CRC (1998:1) 18; Dugard (2000) 435- 437; Starke (1989) 553. 
40 For discussion also see The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary I Geneva Convention p 
27-37. 
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b. Non-international armed conflicts. In the event of a non-international 
conflict, 41 such as a civil war, Article 342 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions and Protocol II are applicable. Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 is the one and only article in the Conventions 
especially written for the event of a non-international conflict. This article, 
which has often been described as "the mini-convention" or the "convention 
within the conventions"43 provides the rules which parties to an internal 
armed conflict are "bound to apply, as a minimum." 
It should be noted that the conditions of application of Protocol II are stricter than those 
provided for by common Article 3. In such situations, the LOAC js intended for the armed 
forces, whether regular or not, taking part in the conflict, and protects every individual or 
category of individuals not, or no longer actively involved in the hostilities.44 
TERMINOLOGY 
In order to understand the application of the LOAC, it is imperative to understand certain 
terminology. 
41 For discussion also see The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary I Geneva Convention p 
49-52. 
42 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions reads as follows: "In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no aqtive part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
arms and those placed, hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited 
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for ... " 
43 Kalshoven (1987) 59; ICRC (1998.1) 21. 
44 For example wounded or sick combatants; persons deprived of their freedom as a result of the conflict; the 
civilian population; medical and religious personnel. 
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a. Attack.45 In international law, "attacks" are acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or defence and in whatever territory 
CO(lducted by land-, sea- or air forces. 
An understanding of the word "attack" is of particular importance with regard 
to the protection of water, because under certain circumstances, attacks may 
occur against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population,46 such as drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works, if certain conditions are met.47 
b. Belligerents.48 Belligerents include the armed forces of a party to a conflict 
consisting of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under 
responsible command, even if that party is represented by a government or 
an authority not recognized by an adverse party. Individual members of 
such armed forces are combatants (the term which, as applied to individuals, 
replaces "belligerents"). 
During armed conflict, these belligerents/combatants will be responsible for 
the execution of military operations against the adverse party, which could 
include attacks affecting water installations, water supplies, etc. 
c. Civilian Population.49 The civilian population is made up of civilian persons. 
During armed conflict, civilians not directly participating in hostilities are 
protected persons and no reprisal action may be taken against them, for 
example, by depriving them of water supplies or access to water supplies. 
d. Combatant. 50 Members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict (other 
than medical personnel and chaplains) are combatants. 51 They have the 
right to participate directly in hostilities. During armed conflict, these 
belligerents/combatants will be responsible for the execution of military 
operations against the opposing party, which could affect water installations, 
water supplies, etc. 
45 ICRC (1984) 22-23. 
46 Article 54(3) of Additional Protocol I supra on p 9 n 38. 
47 Article 54(3) of Additional Protocol! supra on p 9 n 38. 
46 ICRC (1984) 25- 26. 
49 1CRC (1984) 31. 
50 ICRC (1984) 32- 33. Also see definition of "beHigfJrent" supra in paragraph b and Article 43 of Additional 
Protocol I. 
51 Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I. 
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e. Custom.52 Customary international law is the law which has evolved from 
the practice or customs of states. In order for this practice to become 
customary law, states must recogni$e it as binding upon them as law. This 
belief in the obligatory nature of the practice is called the opinio iuris. The 
laws of war stem from the practice of war. They are adopted because they 
are necessary and therefore become customs. Customary international law 
is binding on all states, although they may not be a party to a certain 
international instrument. Certain customary rules have also developed with 
regard to the protection of water, which will be discussed later. 53 
f. Defence, civi1.54 A component of national defence consisting of measures 
and activities to counter dangerous situations caused by armed conflict, such 
as inter alia rescue and relief operations, repair work, distributing food and 
drinking water to the population, etc. 
g. International armed conflict.55 An interneltional armed conflict between 
states is a war. It could also constitute acts of national liberation such as 
peoples fighting against colonial domination, racist regimes, etc. In relation 
to international armed conflict, specific rules exist regarding the protection of 
water and the natural environment during armed conflict. 
h. Military necessity. 56 This is an essential principle of the LOAC. In its wider 
sense, military necessity means doing what is necessary to achieve war 
aims. It is the justification of any recourse to violence, within the limits of the 
general principle of proportionality. 
In its narrow sense, military necessity is recognized by the rules of 
international law and intended to be applied in the context of those rules and 
as derogations thereto. In brief, military necessity in its narrow sense may 
not be invoked unless positive law expressly allows an exception to be made 
on the grounds of military necessity to a particular prohibition or restriction of 
the violence of war. 
This principle is of extreme importance with regard to the protection of water 
during armed conflict, because under certain circumstances, the principle of 
military necessity may be invoked to justify military attacks against, for 
example, certain objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, like drinking water installations, and supplies and irrigation works, 
if certain conditions are met. 
52 ICRC (1984) 38. Also see discussion on p 15- 17. 
53 ICRC (1984) 39. 
54 1CRC (1984) 39, 
55 ICRC (1984) 35. Also see supra on p 9. 
56 1CRC (1984) 75. Also see supra on p 8, paragraph d. 
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i. Non-international armed conflict. 57 This is usually a synonym for a civil 
war. A non-international armed conflict is characterized by fighting between 
the armed forces of a state and dissident or rebel forces within its own 
territory. 
Article 14 of Protocol II affords certain protection indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as drinking water installations and 
supplies and irrigation works and prescribes a total ban on attacking any of 
these objects. This is in contrast with the provisions of Art 54(2) of Protocol 
I, which allows these attacks under certain circumstances during 
international armed conflict. According to Article 15 of Protocol II, attacks on 
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations are also prohibited if 
such attacks may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent 
severe losses among the civilian population. 
j. Obiects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population. 58 These 
include foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works. It is 
prohibited to attack, destroy or remove such objects or to render them 
useless for the purpose of denying them, for their sustenance value, to the 
civilian population, whatever the motive, whether to starve out civilians, to 
cause them to move away, or for any other reason. 
The classification of drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works afford special protection to them during hostilities, and only under 
exceptional circumstances and when certain conditions have been met, 
could they be the object of attack. 59 
k. Prisoner of war. 60 A combatant in an international armed conflict who falls 
into the hands of the enemy power. Prisoners of war are afforded protected 
status. These members must be supplied with medical care if necessary, as 
well as basic necessities such as food, drinking water, etc. 
I. Proportionalitv.61 The principle that seeks to limit damage caused by 
military operations by requiring that the effect of the means and methods of 
warfare used must not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought. 
Even if a target is a military objective, the attack thereon is prohibited if the 
collateral effect would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage to be gained, for example, if a dyke is solely used in 
57 ICRC (1984) 35- 36. 
58 ICRC (1984) 31 and Article 54 of Additional Protocol! supra. 
59 Article 54(3) of Additional Protocol I supra on p 9 n 38. 
60 ICRC (1984) 87- 88. 
61 ICRC (1984) 90. 
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sustenance of military operations and therefore becomes a legitimate military 
target, but the attack thereon would cause many civilians to die, the attack 
would be prohibited. 
m. Reprisals. 52 Reprisals durin.g hostilities in an international armed conflict are 
intrinsically unlawful measures used by a belligerent against the enemy to 
force the enemy to respect the LOAC. Reprisal action against certain 
groups of people and/or objects is also specifically forbidden, for example 
wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons, medical or religious personnel, 
prisoners of war, the civilian population, civilian persons, civilian objects, 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, the natural 
environment, works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as 
dams, and dykes and buildings used for the protection of the civilian 
population. 
n. Starvation.63 A forbidden method of warfare consisting in deliberately 
depriving civilian persons of food. It is, for example, prohibited to attack, 
destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for tne 
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and 
supplies and irrigation works, etc. 
The abovementioned prohibitions do not apply if the objects covered are 
used by an opposing party as sustenance solely for the members of its 
armed forces; or in direct support of military action, with certain provisos. 
These objects may also not be made the object of reprisals. 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The sources of international law are laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 64 which in short, are the following: 
62 ICRC (1984) 97. 
63 ICRC (1984) 109. 
64 
"Article 38. 
1. The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shaH apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civih"zed nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aquo et bono, if the parties 
agree thereto." 
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a. International conventions; 
b. International custom; 
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
th~ various nations, as subsidiary means. 
Article 38, however, does not provide a numerus clausus and unambiguous statement of 
the sources of international law, but is rather considered as a direction to the International 
Court of Justice to consider various materials when deciding disputes submitted to it. 
However, it could still be considered a reasonably clear and precise statement of the 
available sources. 65 
Additional sources which are also considered as sources of international law are 
resolutions, decisions or determinations of the organs of international institutions,66 as well 
as so-called 'soft law'. 67 Some of these sources will now be discussed in short. 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS (TREATIES) 
According to Dixon,68 international conventions are the only way states can consciously 
create international law. Treaties may be concluded between two states (bilateral), or 
between many states (multilateral) and they are usually the outcome of long and protracted 
negotiations. A treaty is in essence, a bargain between legal equals and it may cover any 
aspect of international relations. 
The word 'treaty' is also defined in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention.69 
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
According to Dixon, 70 customary international law is that Jaw which has evolved from the 
practice or customs of states. It is the cornerstone of the modern law of nations and 
65 Dixon (1990) 21. 
66 Starke (1989) 32; 51 -54; Booysen (1989) 57- 58; Dixon (1990) 42-44. 
67 Starke (1989) 32; 51 -54; Booysen (1989) 57- 58; Dixon (1990) 42-44. 
68 Dixon (1990) 23; Booysen (1989) 33- 34. 
69 
"For the purposes of the present Convention: 
(a) 'treaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written format governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation;• 
70 Dixon (1990) 27. 
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certainly one of the most important sources of international law. In order for a certain rule 
or principle to be considered customary international law, certain requirements need to be 
met. Without discussing these in too much detail, they are the following: 
a. There must be a state practice. 71 State practice includes, but is not limited 
to, actual activity (acts and omissions), statements made in respect of 
concrete situations or disputes, statements of legal principle made in the 
abstract, etc. According to Starke, 72 further evidence of state practice could 
also be found in acts or declarations by statesmen, opinions of legal 
advisors to state governments, press releases or official statements by 
government spokesmen official books or documents, such as military 
manuals, the internal regulations of each state's diplomatic and consular 
services, etc. 
The requirement that there should be a state practice has been confirmed in 
some of the decisions of the ICJ. 73 
b. Consistency of practice. 74 One of the most important factors in the 
formation of customary law, is that the state practice must be reasonably 
consistent. In the Lotus case75 the ICJ decided that it must be 'constant and 
uniform'. 76 This prinCiple was also confirmed in the Asylum case. 77 In the 
71 Dixon (1990) 28; Booysen (1989) 48- 49; Starke (1989) 36- 37. 
72 Starke (1989) 36- 38. 
73 See Nicaragua v United States 19861CJ Reports. The Court stated the following on p 98, paragraph 186: 
• ... The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding 
practice must be in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of 
customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States, should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should 
generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as an indication of the recognition of the new 
rule ... " 
74 Dixon (1990) 28; Booysen (1989) 49; Dugard (2000) 28. 
75 Lotus Case ( 1927) PCIJ Ser. A No. 10. 
76 Dixon (1990) 28. 
77 Asylum Case 1950 ICJ Reports 266. On 276 the Court ruled that: 
"The Party which relies on custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a 
manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Columbian Government must prove that 
the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in 
question ... " 
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Nicaragua v United States case, 78 the Court also confirmed the principle of 
general consistency. 79 
c. Generality of practice. 80 In order for a universal norm of customary 
international law to develop, the practice must be fairly general. That means 
that the practice must be common to a significant number of states. Not all 
states, though, need to participate before a general practice can become 
law.81 
There is no mathematical formula to determine how many states must 
participate in a practice before it is considered customary law. According to 
Dixon, 82 the degree of generality will vary with the subject matter. Booysen83 
states that it will de£end on the specific circumstances and the specific rule. 
However, Booysen states the general rule seems to be that the majority of 
states must follow the practice, or that the rule must enjoy such general 
recognition or application, that it will not be rejected by a civilized state. 
It is also, however, a recognized principle that not all states are required to 
follow a customary rule85 and that a customary rule could even develop 
between only two states. 86 
d. Duration of practice.87 No clear guidelines exist on the time required for the 
formation of customary law. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases88 
78 Case concerning MHitary and ParamHitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 19861CJ Reports 14. 
79 See p 98 paragraph 186. • ... The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
corresponding practice must be in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence 
of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States, should, in general, be consistent 
with such rules, ... " 
80 Dixon (1990) 28- 29; Booysen (1989} 49. 
81 Dixon (1990} 29. 
82 Dixon (1990) 29. 
83 Booysen (1989) 49. 
84 Booysen (1989) 49. 
85 Dixon (1990) 29; Booysen (1989) 49. 
86 Starke (1989) 39; Booysen 49; Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case 1960 ICJ Reports 6 on p 39 the 
Court stated: 
"It is difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom may be established on the 
basis of long practices must necessarily be larger than two. The Court sees no reason why long 
continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form 
the basis of mutual tights and obHgations between the two States. • 
87 Dixon (1990) 30. 
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suggest that the length of time needed will vary from subject to subject and 
further, that the passage of only a brief period of time is !'lot necessarily a 
bar to the formation of customary law. 
e. Opinio /uris. 89 It is not enough for the formation of customary law that there 
is general, uniform and consistent state practice. In order for this practice to 
constitute law, states must recognise it as binding upon them as law. State 
practice must be accompanied by a belief that the practice is obligatory, 
rather than merely convenient or habitual (opinio iuris). 
In the Lotus case, 90 the PCIJ emphasized that the opmto tuns was an 
essential element in the formation of customary law. This was confirmed in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases91 and the Nicaragua v USA case.92 
International custom with regard to the law on water. In general terms, 
international custom has given rise to a number of important principles with regard 
to the shared use of water resources.93 These include: 
88 Supra at n 86. The Court stated on page 42 paragraph 73 that: 
"I.Mth respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be 
considered to have become a general rule of International law, it might be that, even without the 
passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the 
convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially 
affected." 
89 Dixon (1990) 31; Starke (1989) 38-39, Booysen (1989) 48; 50; Dugard (2000) 31-32. 
90 Dixon (1990) 31. 
91 1969 ICJ Reports 3. The Court held on page 44 paragraph 77 that: 
"The essential point in this connection - and it seems necessary to stress it - is that even if these 
instances of action by non-parties to the convention were much more numerous than they in fact are, 
they would not, even in the aggregate, suffice in themselves to constitute the opinio iuris; - for in order 
to achieve this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a 
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for 
such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio iuris 
sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts 
to a legal obligation. n 
92 Supra n 73. In this case the Court held on page 108- 109 paragraph 207: 
"In considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court has to emphasize that, as we 
observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for a new customary rule to be formed, not only 
must the acts concerned "amount to a settled practice': but they must be accompanied by the opinio 
iuris sive necessitatis." 
93 1CRC (1995) 54- 55, and Sironneau (1994) 4. 
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a. the obligation to co-operate and negotiate with the intention of reaching an 
agreement; 
b. the prohibition of water resource developments which may have damaging 
and lasting consequences to the detriment of other states; 
c. the obligation of prior consultation; 
d. the fair use of shared resources, including groundwater. 
If one considers the abovementioned as being customary international law, then the 
question arises whether these rules will apply to a state which is not a party to a specific 
treaty or treaties which regulate environmental protection during armed conflict. It is 
submitted that these principles offer no, or very restricted protection to water during armed 
conflict, due to inter alia the following reasons: 
a. Firstly, these rules will only apply in instances where water resources are 
shared by countries. In a fair number of cases, countries do not share water 
resources. These rules will have no application if conflict breaks out 
between them. 
b. Secondly, these rules do not regulate the protection of water during internal 
conflict in a country, for example during a civil war. In such a situation, these 
rules will not be applicable. 
However, where countries do share water resources and one or more of these countries is 
not a party to treaties such as the Geneva Conventions, the state or states not party or 
parties to treaty law will be bound by the rules of customary international rules regulating 
the use of water. It would, for example, be prohibited for a warring neighbouring state to 
cut off water supplies to its neighbouring enemy state. Overall it seems that these 
customary rules have rather limited application. 
The abovementioned customary rules must, however, be clearly distinguished from the 
LOAC customary international rules applicable to the protection of water, such as the 
prohibitions on poisoning the enemy's water supplies, indiscriminate attacks, objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, etc. Therefore, for purposes of this 
discussion, the main focus is on the LOAC customary international rules applicable to the 
protection of water. 
RESOLUTIONS, DECISIONS OR DETERMINATIONS OF THE ORGANS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Resolutions of international organisations are omitted from the list of materials which the 
Court may consider when deciding disputes submitted to it. This may be because such 
resolutions do not usually, of themselves, create binding law94 and are generally considered 
94 Booysen (1989) 57. 
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to be material or evidential sources.95 According to Starke,96 decisions or determinations of 
the organs of international institutions, or of international conferences, may lead to the 
formation of rules of international law in a number of ways. One of the most important ones 
is that they may represent intermediate or final steps in the evolution of customary rules. 97 
The decisive criterion, according to Starke,98 is the extent to which the decision, 
determination or recommendation has been adhered to in practice. 
As a general rule, resolutions of the UN General Assembly are not considered binding, 
even if they are adopted unanimously. They may, however be evidence of existing 
customary internationallaw.99 Dugard is of the opinion that to determine to what extent 
recommendations of the political or~ans of the UN play a part in the formation of custom, is 
an issue of much public debate. 1 He states that a resolution of either the General 
Assembly or the Security Council categorized as a recommendation is not binding on states 
per se. Dugard suggests that an accumulation of resolutions, a repetition of 
recommendations on a particular subject, may amount to evidence of collective state 
practice on the part of states. He recognizes the fact, however, that it may be difficult to 
indicate the precise point at which such a practice became customary law.101 
SOFT LAW 
According to Dixon, 102 'soft law' is a term firstly used to describe different but related 
phenomena in international law. Dixon describes it as the name given to those rules of 
international law that do not stipulate concrete rights or obligations for the legal persons to 
whom they are addressed. Such rules are normative - they are rules of law - but their 
content is inherently flexible or vague.103 Secondly, according to Dixon,104 the term 'soft 
law' is a description of those values, guidelines, ideas and proposals that may develop into 
rules of international law but have not yet done so. This is not really law at all, but is 
another name for principles de lege ferenda, or principles which could become normative in 
the future. Often these principles emerge from the codified conclusions of international 
conferences or are embodied in non-binding agreements.105 
95 Dixon (1990) 42. 
96 Starke 51 -53. 
97 Booysen (1989) 50. 
98 Starke (1989) 51 -52. 
99 Dixon (1990) 42; Booysen (1989) 50. 
100 Dugard (2000) 32. 
101 Dugard (2000) 32. 
102 Dixon (1990) 44. 
103 For example, Human Rights Treaties. 
104 Dixon (1990) 45. 
105 Dixon (1990) 45. 
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Dugard defines the term 'soft law' as being imprecise standards, generated by declarations 
adopted by diplomatic conferences or resolutions of international organizations, that are 
intended to serve as guidelines to states in their conduct, but which lacks the status of 
'law'.1oe 
DUTIES OF STATE PARTIES TO THE LOAC TREATIES 
A state party to the LOAC treaties has specific obligations in terms thereof. With regard to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 1 states the following: 
"The High Contracting parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect107 for the present 
Convention in all circumstances. " 
The abovementioned underlines the shared responsibility of all parties to the Conventions 
and Protocol I to make sure that the LOAC obligations are implemented by each and every 
state 108• Since Protocol I contains specific obligations relating to the protection of the 
environment and water, it follows that all parties must comply with their treaty obligations. 
If states are parties to conventions such as the abOvementioned, they are under an 
international obligation not to violate those obligations. According to Dixon, 109 when a 
binding international obligation exist for a state, it must fulfil that obligation irrespective of 
whether its national law permits it to do so or forbids it from doing so. Dixon states that if a 
change in national law is required in order that a state may fulfil its international obligations, 
then the state is under an international duty to make that change or otherwise mitigate its 
international responsibility.110 Under international law, only in certain specific 
circumstances would a state be allowed to violate its international obligations, such as inter 
106 Ougard (1990) 36. 
107 Also see also Article 1 of Additional Protocol I, which has a similar provision. According to Commentary I 
Geneva Convention, p 26 -27, the words "in aH circumstances• means that the Convention must be respected in 
peace as well as in war in the case of those provisions which are applicable both in peace and in war and that 
these words do not relate to civil war. 
108 Article 80 of Protocol I states: 
"1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the confftct shall without delay take all necessary 
measures for the execution of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol. 
2. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shaH give orders and instructions to ensure 
observance of the Conventions and this Protocol, and shall supervise their execution." 
109 Dixon (1990) 79. 
110 Also see Starke (1989) 88- 89. 
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alia, consent, 111 takin~ countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act,112 
djstress, 113 necessity, 14 self-defence, 115 etc. 
PROTECTION OF WATER ITO LOAC INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
TREATIES AFFORDING THE ENVIRONMENT INDIRECT PROTECTION116 
General Principles. A clear distinction must be drawn between the so-called international 
"LOAC Environmental Law", and "International Environmental Law''. The aforementioned 
refers to LOAC treaties affording protection to the environment which apply during 
international or internal armed conflict. The latter refers to the general environmental 
treaties which afford limited protection to the environment during hostilities, but mainly 
apply during peacetime. 
Environmental damage in wartime is an inevitable reality. Throughout history, war has 
always left its mark, sometimes extremely long-lasting, on the natural environment. The 
rules of the LOAC tor the protection of the environment therefore aim not to prevent 
damage altogether, but rather to limit it to a level deemed tolerable. 
The most important general principle of the LOAC is the one in terms of which the right of 
the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. This 
basic principle which was first set forth in the Declaration of St Petersburg in 1868, has 
frequently been reiterated in LOAC treaties, such as Art 35 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions. 
The principle of proportionality is another basic principl~ of the LOAC, 117 and clearly also 
finds application in protection of the environment during times of armed conflict. 
Treaties affording indirect protection to the environment. Firstly the term "indirect 
protection" of the environment should be defined. Until the early 1970s, the LOAC Was 
"traditionally anthropocentric in scope and focus". 118 Indeed, LOAC texts adopted before 
then made no reference to the environment as such, as the concept did not exist at the 
time. Nevertheless, various provisions relating, for example, to private property, or the 
protection of the civilian population, afforded the environment some form of protection. 
111 Article 27 of the ILC Draft Articles on state Responsibility (1996). 
112 Article 30 of the /LC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1996). 
113 Article 32 of the JLC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1996). 
114 Article 33 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility(1996). 
115 Article 34 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility ( 1996). 
116 Bouvier (1991) 3. 
117 Supra at 13. 
118 Bouvier (1991) 3. 
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Some of these provisions are found in many international treaties, and have become 
customary intemationallaw.119 The most important are discussed below. 
The importance of the general principles stated in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration has 
already been stated. 120 The Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land121 in its annexed Regulations contains a proVision, namely Art 23 paragraph 1 (g), 
which clearly illustrates the aforementioned anthropocentric approach. The article states 
that it is forbidden: 
"to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war." 
The abovementioned is one of the earliest provisions for the protection of the environment 
in armed conflict. A question which comes to mind, is what is meant by the word 
"property''? 122 There is little question that Article 23(g) applies to tangible property such as 
land, cattle, crops or water supplies. However, its applicability in other enVironmental 
contexts might not be such a clear cut case. For instance, could the atmosphere, ozone 
layer or climate be regarded as "property''? There are no definite answers to these 
questions. 
Several treaties that limit or prohibit the use of certain means of warfare also contribute to 
the protection of the enVironment in armed conflict. 123 The Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted on 10 October 1980, is of 
particular interest for two reasons: 
a. It sets up a mechanism whereby it may be revised or amended.124 This 
Convention has annexed to it certain protocols prohibiting the use of certain 
weapons.125 Article 8 of the Convention proVides for the reView and 
amendment of the Convention or the annexed protocols. This procedure 
119 Such as the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, supra n 28; and Article 23 paragraph 1(g) to the Hague 
Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
120 Supra at 6 and n 28. 
121 Convention No IV of 1907 reaffirms and expands on those principles. 
122 Schmitt (1996) 30- 31. 
123 For example the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases 
and of Bacteriological Methods of warfare, adopted in Geneva on 17 June 1925; The Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production aM Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction. Adopted on 10 April1972. 
124 Art 8. 
125 For example Protocol I on non-detectable fragments; Protocol II on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of 
mines, booby-traps and other devices; Protocol II on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons; Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons. 
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could assist those countries who are parties to the Convention and who are 
advocating the necessity for a separate protocol for the protection of the 
environment, to have this protocol adopted. 
b. Certain of its provisions, in particular those concerning the use of mines, 
booby-traps and other devices and incendiary weapons, contribute to the 
protection of the environment in time of armed conflict, since the use of 
these devices in most instances, also causes damage to the environment. 
Another treaty, namely the Geneva Convention IV, 126 in particular Art 53, prohibiting the 
destruction of real or personal property, 127 provides minimum protection of the environment 
in case of enemy occupation. In terms of this article, "Any destruction by the Occupying 
Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, 
or to the State, or to public authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations, is 
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations." 
It is clear that the provisions discussed above afford protection to water installations, water 
supplies, etc, during occupation by the enemy, unless military necessity would justify an 
attack on them. 
As already discussed,128 states who are parties to the conventions referred to above, are 
legally obliged to honour these conventions. This means that those provisions regulating 
the protection of the environment must also be honoured. 
States who are not parties to the treaties, are legally bound to honour customary 
international law LOAC principles, for example the prohibition on poisoning the enemy's 
water supplies, executing indiscriminate attacks without military necessity, not attacking 
civilians or civilian property unless the latter is solely used for military purposes, etc. ft is 
clear that by virtue of these, at least some kind of protection is also afforded to the 
environment during hostilities. 
TREATIES AFFORDING THE ENVIRONMENT SPECIFIC PROTECTION 
In this regard, two treaties are of major importance: 
a. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques ("ENMOD"), · and 
b. The 1977 Additional Protocol 1129 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
126 Supra at 6. 
127 This includes, according to Commentary IV of the Geneva Conventions, p 301, "the prohibition covers the 
destruction of all property (real or personal). .. " 
128 Supra at 15. 
129 Supra at 6. 
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ENMOD Convention. This Convention was adopted under the United Nations auspices, 
largely in response to fears aroused by the use of methods and means of warfare that 
caused extensive environmental damage during the Vietnam war. Article 1 ( 1) of the 
Convention prohibits: 
"military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long 
lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party". 
Article 1(2) of the Convention also prohibits a state party from assisting, encouraging or 
inducing any state, group of states or international organization to engage in activities 
contrary to the provisions of Article 1. 
Article 2 of the Convention describes the term "environmental modification techniqueS' as: 
"any technique for changing- through the deHberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, 
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or 
of outer space." 
Although the ENMOD Convention contains specific provisions to protect the environment, 
the application of the convention is limited by the fact that many countries have not yet 
become party to the convention. This means that these states will only be bound by 
customary international LOAC principles as already discussed and not by this treaty. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that interpretational problems exist between Article 1(1) and 
Article 2 of the Convention. Article 1(1) prohibits the hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, but refrains to state the degree of fault required, i.e. intent or 
negligence. It is clear that Article 1(1) should be read in conjunction with Article 2, the latter 
defining the term "environmental modification techniques" as the "deliberate manipulation of 
natural processes" (my emphasis), thus clearly requiring intention as the required degree of 
fault. The problem is that, widespread, long lasting or severe effects to the environment 
could occur as a result of the collateral effect of a military operation where there was no 
deliberate effort to seriously damage the environment. If the strict meaning of the wording 
of Article 2 is taken into consideration, it means that gross negligence or negligence would 
be insufficient to found liability for a state party for its actions. 
1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.130 Protocol I contains two 
articles pertaining specifically to the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict. 
These two articles illustrate the growing awareness of the importance of respect for the 
environment that emerged in the early 1970s. 
Article 35, paragraph 3, stipulates the following: 
"It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment". 
130 Bouvier (1991) 4. 
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The abovementioned article, pertaining to methods and means of warfare, protects the 
environment as such. 
Article 55 provides that: 
"1. Care shaH be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the t~se of methods or 
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage tc> the 
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the pc>pulation. 
(2) Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited." 
It should be noted that this article, which is intended to protect the civilian population 
against the effects of hostilities, is found within the broader context of protection of civilian 
objects.131 
Article 55 does more than merely restate Article 35, paragraph 3. It establishes a general 
obligation to protect the environment during the conduct of hostilities, but the obligation is 
directed at the protection of civilians, whereas Article 35, paragraph 3, aims to protect the 
environment as such. 
As a logical extension, Article 55 prohibits reprisals against the natural environment in that 
they would penalize humanity as a whole. 
Additional Protocol I contains further provisions contributing indirectly to environmental 
protection in time of conflict, such as Articles 54132 and 56. 133 
Only states who are parties to Additional Protocol I would be bound by its ratified 
provisions. Interesting to note, is that although the USA had signed Protocol I, it has not 
ratified it. The USA has, however declared that it views Articles 52 (General protection of 
civilian objects) and Article 54 (Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian popul~tion) as customary internationallaw.134 This means that the USA is bound to 
comply with these principles. This is of significant importance with regard to protection of 
water, because Article 54 specifically affords protection to drinking water installations and 
supplies and irrigation works. However, regarding protection of the natural environment, 135 
the USA specifically objects to Article 55136 of Protocol I. This means that it is not bound by 
these provisions of Protocol I, since, as already state(:!, the USA has not ratified this 
Protocol. 
131 Articles 52- 56, Chapter Ill, Protocol I. 
132 Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. 
133 Protection of works and insta11ations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations. 
134 Jackson (1997) 18- 20. 
135 Jackson (1997) 18-20. 
136 Supra at 25. 
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LINK BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS OF PROTOCOL I AND THE RULES OF THE 
ENMOD CONVENTION137 
The abovementioned two treaties prohibit different types of environmental damage. While 
Protocol I prohibits recourse to environmental warfare, i.e. the use of methods of warfare 
likely to upset vital balances of nature, the ENMOD Convention prohibits what is known as 
geophysical warfare.138 
Far from overlapping, these two international treaties are complementary. However, they 
give rise to tricky problems stemming in particular from the fact that they attribute different 
meanings to identical terms, such as "widespread, long-term and severe". To give but one 
example of such semantic difficulties, the definition of "/ong-terrri' ranges from several 
months or a season for the United Nations Convention, to several decades for the Protocol. 
Moreover, the conditions of being widespread, long-term and severe are cumulative in 
Protocol I, whereas each condition is sufficient in and of itself for the EN MOD Convention 
to apply.139 
There is a danger that s~ch discrepancies might hamper the implementation of these rules. 
Hopefully, due to the growing ~ncern over environmental protection d~ring armed conflict, 
these two treaties will harmonize in future. 
Furthermore, with regard to the protection of the natural environment, Article 55140 to 
Protocol I prohibits "the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or mav be 
expected to cause such damage to the environment ... " (my emphasis). The wording 
indicates that not only intentional conduct, but also negligent conduct ("may be expected') 
is sufficient to transgress the provisions of Article 55. As already discussed, 141 Article 2 of 
the EN MOD Convention, only requires intention as the required degree of fault. 
ROLE OF THE MARTENS CLAUSE IN THE PROTECTION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
The preamble to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war 
on land contains a clause, known after its drafter,142 as the Martens clause, which provides 
as follows: 
137 Bouvier (1991) 4. 
138 This implies the deliberate manipulation of natural processes and may trigger hurricanes, tidal waves, 
earthquakes, and rain or snow. 
139 Bouvier (1991) 4. 
140 Supra at 25. 
141 Supra at 24. 
142 Professor de Martens of the University of St Petersburg, legal advisor to the Russian imperial foreign 
ministry during the Hague conferences. 
28 
"in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain 
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience." 
The purpose of this clause was not only to confirm the continuance of customary law, but 
also to prevent arguments that because a particular activity had not been prohibited in a 
treaty, it was lawful. Humanitarian considerations are therefore guiding principles which put 
a brake on undertakings which might otherwise be justified by the principles of military 
necessity.143 
The question arising is, how useful is this clause in limiting environmental damage during 
warfare? 144 The benefit of this principle is that it operates during the evolution of 
prescriptive norms. As the law grapples with how to handle environmental issues, the "laws 
of humanity' and "dictates of public conscience" will theoretically serve to ensure a 
modicum of protection. The problem, however, is sometimes how to determine the 
meaning of "mora/law and public opinion", since much of the difficulty will result from the 
surfacing of cross-cultural and intra-societal differences when determining whether a 
Martens situation has presented itself or not. 
SPECIFIC PROHIBITIONS RELATING TO WATER DURING THE CONDUCt OF 
HOSTILITIES146 
Besides the general protection applicable to all civilian objects, certain specific rules exist 
which apply to the protection of water during armed conflict. 
Prohibition on the use of poison. This customary rule is enshrined in the Hague 
Regulations, 146 as well as other documents. 147 
Prohibition on the destruction of enemy proQ!rty. Water may be part of either public or 
private property. The Hague Rules state that it is forbidden to destroy or seize the enemy's 
prope~, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
ofwar. 48 
143 Rogers (1996) 6- 7; Kalshoven (1987) 73. 
144 Schmitt (1996) 31. 
145 1CRC (1995) 2-4. 
146 Article 23(a) stipulates that it is forbidden to "employ poison or poisoned weapons." 
147 For example, the 1863 Lieber Code destined for the US armed forces, stipulated that military necessity 
"does not admit the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district.· 
148 Supra at 22. 
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The same principle appears in the Fourth Geneva Convention. 149 In this case the 
"extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly' is qualified as a grave breach, and thus a war crime.150 
Prohibition on the destruction of obiects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population. 151 The provisions of Protocol I in this regard are very important. Jt is designed 
to protect objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, quoting as 
examples "foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, 
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works"152 (my emphasis). 
Only imperative military necessity entitles a warring party to destroy indispensable objects, 
with the proviso that they must be situated within the territory under its control. The words 
used to designate acts likely to harm such objects are intended to cover aU eventualities, 153 
including pollution, by chemical or other agents. The same wording is used in Protocol fl. 
A derogation from the immunity of indispensable objects is allowed only if such objects 
serve as sustenance only for the members of the armed forces or in direct support of 
military action. Even in those cases, belligerents have to abstain from any action which 
may be expected to reduce the civilian population to starvation or de£rive it of vital water 
supplies. Reprisals against indispensable objects are forbidden. 1 This prohibition, 
however, does not appear in Protocol II. 
Prohibition of attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces. In view 
of the extremely dangerous effects which attacks against "works or installations containing 
dangerous forces"155 might have on the lives of the civilian population and their property, 
the 1977 Additional Protocols prohibit such attacks, even in cases where these objects are 
military objectives.156 
Three types of works and installations are specified, to wit dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations. Past experience in armed conflict has shown that these are 
considered priority targets, the destruction of which can decide the outcome of the conflict. 
Aware of the dangers inherent in such destruction, which go far beyond the legitimate 
military objectives of attacks, the authors of Protocol I added further dauses to supplement 
this special protection as follows. 
149 Article 53. 
150 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 147. 
151 Zemmali (1995) 2- 3. 
152 Art 54(2) of 1977 Additional Protocol I to 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
153 
"it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless". 
154 Supra at 13. 
155 Article 56 Additional Protocol I and Article 15 Additional Protocol II. 
156 Article 56 of Additional Protocol I, and Article 15 of Additional Protocol II. 
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Even military objectives located at, or in the vicinity of such installations, shall not be made 
the object of attack "if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the 
installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population".157 The special 
protection against attack provided for the two types of installations (dams, dykes and 
nuclear electrical generating stations on the one hand, and military objectives located at or 
in the vicinity of such installations on the other) is waived only when any of these works is 
used "in regular, significant and direct support of military operations"158 and if such attack is 
"the only feasible way to terminate such supporf'. 
Paragraph 3 of the same article calls upon belligerents to take precautionary measures to 
ensure that the "civilian population and individual civilians" receive the protection accorded 
to them by international law. Nothing is said of the precautions that must be taken for 
civilian property, but it may legitimately be concluded that this is covered by the second 
sentence of the paragraph. 
Reprisals against such installations and military objectives are prohibited, 159 while the 
general prohibition on locating any military objectives in the vicinity of such works is 
tempered by permission to erect purely defensive installations to protect such works. The 
conclusion of special agreements to provide extra protection or for identification, using the 
sign indicated in Protocol I, 160 is left to the initiative of the parties. From the point of view of 
repression, "launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces 
in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii)" is regarded as a 
grave breach of the Conventions and the Protocol I. It should be noted that this provision 
also covers civilians and civilian objects. 
Observance of these rules governing the conduct of hostilities is sufficient to ensure 
effective protection of water resources and installations which are indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population. Parties to the conflict are also under further obligations 
with regard to the protection of victims. One of these is the provision of water. 
Water as an indispensable resource for the survival of protected persons.161 The 
LOAC seeks to ensure at least minimum normal living conditions for the persons it is 
intended to protect. One practical way of ensuring this, is by satisfying basic human needs, 
such as supplying the need for water. 
Assistance and care for the wounded and sick are inconceivable without water. To be able 
to do their work, medical staff need water. The same applies to medical equipment and 
157 Art 56(1) Additional Protocol I supra. 
158 Article 56(2) Additional Protocol I supra. 
159 Supra at 12; 13. 
160 (Annex I, Article 17). 
161 Zemmali (1995) 4. 
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installations as well as the hygiene and maintenance of any place where there are 
protected persons.162 
ROLE OF THE CIVIL DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONS 
One of the particular humanitarian tasks of civil defence organizations, whose rights and 
duties are laid down in the provisions of Protocol I, is the emergency repair of 
indispensable public utilities.163 
Even though civil defence personnel are active only within the national territory, whether it 
is occupied or not, these provisions strengthen the protection accorded to civilian objects 
and, if faithfully observed, can make a valuable contribution to the assistance provided to 
the civilian population. The role of civil defence organizations in protecting water storage 
and other supply systems must be stressed and respected. 164 
These relevant rules clearly show that the protection of water in times of armed conflict is 
an integral part of the LOAC. It also shows that this law, in its most recent codification, has 
taken account of the impact of modem warfare on water installations and reserves of 
drinking water, for indeed the damage caused to water as a result of hostilities could 
jeopardize the fauna and flora of a region, force entire populations to leave their homes, 
and eliminate any sign of life. Humanitarian aid agencies have witnessed such effects in 
various situations and have important tasks to accomplish in this domain. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DURING NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICTS 
The international law that protects victims of non-international armed conflict is less well 
developed that the LOAC governing international armed conflict. 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, 165 does not state anything specific about 
protecting the environment from attack in civil war. It only addresses humanitarian issues in 
the strictest sense. 
162 This is so obvious it has not been considered necessary to formulate specific rules. In some contexts, 
however, an explicit reference has been made thereto. Article 20, paragraph 2 of the Third Geneva Convention 
stipulates that prisoners of war who are being evacuated must be supplied by the Detaining Power with 
sufficient food and patable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The 5ame obligation 
is laid down in Article 46, paragraph 3 of the said Convention, for the transfer of prisoners of war, and in Article 
127, paragraph 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, for the transfer to internees. Drinking water is also referred 
to in a separate paragraph of the common article to the two Conventions and concerning the daily food rations 
of prisoners of war and civilian internees (Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions), Article 26, paragraph 3 and 
Article 89, paragraph 3, respectively. 
163 other explicitly mentioned tasks in aid of the civilian population include fire-fighting, provision of emergency 
supplies and the preservation of objects essential for survival. 
164 1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 61(a)(vii), (x) and (xiv) in particular. 
165 Supra at 9 and n 42. 
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The 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, contains no provisions directly 
concerning the environment However, Article 14, on the protection of objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, has a direct impact on warfare and 
the environment, with its prohibition of attacks on agricultural areas, irrigation works, etc. 
DIFFICULTIES IN ENFORCING RULES TO PROHIBIT THE USE OF WATER AS A 
WEAPON OF DESTRUCTION166 
Until fairly recently, there appears to have been no treaty-based or customary regulation of 
any kind which specifically prohibits the use of water as a weapon of destruction. More 
particularly, there was no actual ban on the destruction of hydraulic installations, the cutting 
of water supplies to civilian populations, the use of water for military purposes to make 
survival impossible, etc. 
Neither the Hague Convention, 167 nor the Geneva Protocol of 1925 contained provisions 
destined to safeguard water and hydraulic installations in the event of armed conflict. It has 
been necessary to wait for Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.168 
Many states, however, have not ratified Additional Protocol I. Destroying a strategic target 
such as an electricity power plant is enough to disrupt the production of water. Certain 
rules laid down in the conventions can, nevertheless be applied to water. 169 
Drawn up at the instigation of the International Law Association, the so-called "Helsinki 
Rule~· of 1966, relating to the use of international waterways, are intended to prohibit the 
poisoning of water essential for the health and survival of civilian populations or the act of 
making it unfit for human consumption. The Rules further seek to ban the diversion of 
waterways where such action would cause disproportionate suffering to the civilian 
population or substantial damage to the environment. Moreover, water supply installations 
which are indispensable for the maintenance of the minimum conditions for survival must 
not be disrupted or destroyed, 170 and "the destruction of hydraulic installations presenting 
risks, such as dams and dykes, is forbidden'' .171 However, these rules can be categorized 
as so-called "soft law" .172 Soft law is not considered legally binding on states and is 
considered as normative, but it could give direction to states on their course of action, and 
these rules could over time also develop into customary internatronallaw. 
166 ICRC (1995) 61 -62. 
167 No IV of 1907. See supra at 22 and n 121. 
166 Supra at 25 and n 132. 
169 For example, Article 23 of the Hague Convention No IV (supra) prohibits the use dispersion of poison, while 
the Geneva Protocol forbids not only asphyxiating or poisonous gases, liquids or other products, but also 
bacteriological weapons. 
170 Article 2. 
171 Article 5. 
172 Supra at 20. 
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Finally, in the wake of the Gulf War, United Nations General Assembly Resolution No 
A/47/37 shows a new tendency to prohibit any destruction of the environment which cannot 
be strictly justified by military ends.173 Resolutions of the General Assembly are also not 
considered legally binding on states. These resolutions could, however, develop into 
customary internationallaw.174 
All these measures are intended to apply not only during military operations, but also during 
territorial occupation. But it is obvious that a wide gap exists between legal rules and their 
enforcement, aJI the more in case of armed conflict. The population explosion, the 
multiplication of water uses arising from urban development, industry and agriculture, and 
the gaps in international law with regard to the use of water as a weapon of destruction, all 
make this approach inadequate. An integrated approach to water uses should therefore be 
adopted. 
Although there has in recent decades been a promising development towards an integrated 
approach, everything possible must still be done to accelerate the process if international 
law on water is to provide support in the resolution of conflicts over use.175 
A FIFTH GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRON· 
MENT? . 
The Gulf war served to refocus international attention on the environmental impact of 
warfare. After the war, many non-governmental groups and other interest groups felt that 
the rules of international law did not afford sufficient protection to the environment. 
As the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict is part of international 
humanitarian law, it is of particular concern to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(hereinafter the "/CRC'). The major challenge facing international humanitarian law today, 
is impl~mentation. There is a blatant contrast between these highly developed rules, many 
of which enjoy universal acceptance, and their repeated violation in conflicts around the 
world.176 These violations have included inter alia long-lasting chemical pollution on land, 
despoliation of land by mines and other dangerous objects and threats to water supplies 
and other necessities of life. 
173 This Resolution states the following : 
"1. ~States to take all measures to ensure compliance with the existing international law applicable to 
the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict; 
2. Apoeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the rel&vant 
international conventions; 
3. Urges States to take_steps to Incorporate the provisions of international law applicable to the 
environment into their military manuals and to ensure that they are effectively disseminated." 
174 Booysen (1989) 57; starke (1989) 51; Dugard (2000) 32. 
175 1CRC (1994.1) 62. 
176 1CRC (1997) 1 -2. 
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In the wake of the Rio Dedaration on Environment and Development, in particular Principle 
24,177 and at the request of the General Assembly, the ICRC has consulted with wortd 
experts on the course to be followed to improve environmental protection in times of armed 
conflict. 
The option recommended by these experts was not to develop new law - the proposed Fifth 
Geneva Convention did not come into existence - but rather to emphasize better 
knowledge and respect for existing law. Some countries expressed their view against the 
adoption of a Fifth Geneva Convention.178 They argued - certainly not without merit - that 
the drafting of a new convention would raise many problems, one of them being the danger 
of regarding the environment as a single entity about which legislation could be enacted. 
Moreover, other violations of the LOAC had been perpetrated, and violations of human 
rights were at least as serious as those of environmental law. 
With the assistance of the experts consulted, the ICRC therefore developed guidelines for 
military manuals and instructions 179 on the protection of the environment in times of armed 
conflict. Without formally adopting these guidelines, the General Assembly has invited all 
states to "disseminate widely" the Guidelines developed by the ICRC and to "give due 
consideration to the possibility of incorporating them into their military manuals and other 
instructions addressed to their military personnef'.180 
Subsequent efforts have been made to spread knowledge of these Guidelines, 
concentrating in particular on helping states to promote broad circulation of their content 
and to consider the possibility of incorporating them in their respective military instruction 
manuals as invited by the General Assembly Resolution.1a1 It is therefore not inconceivable 
that over time these rules could develop into customary international law. 
These Guidelines must be taken for what they are intended to be: a tool for making the 
existing international legal rules on the protection of the natural environment in times of 
armed conflict better known to those who must comply with them in the course of military 
operations. The Guidelines are neither an international treaty nor the draft in a codification 
exercise. As a summary of applicable law, they deserve the widest dissemination and 
scrupulous respect. It is therefore quite possible that these rules could develop into 
customary international law. 
177 Principle 24 states that "warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shaH therefore 
respect international Jaw providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and co-operate in its 
further development, as necessary." 
178 ICRC (1992) 32. 
179 The Guidelines have been published as an Annex to UN Doc A/49/323(1994). 
180 General Assembly Resolution 49/50 on the United Nations Decade of International Law (9 Dec 1994). 
181 Supra at 32 and n 173. 
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During 21 to 23 November 1994, the ICRC also organized an intemational symposium on 
water in armed conflicts in Montreux. 182 The symposium was the first step in an effort to 
draw the attention of the intemational community to the problems related to the protection 
of water, and to seek solutions. The initiative's main objective was to help achieve more 
effective protection of the victims of war, especially where water installations and supplies 
are affected by hostilities. 
At the close of the symposium, some important principles were agreed upon, 183 most 
notably to: 
a. aim for absolute protection of water supplies and systems, and to extend 
legal protection to include engineers attempting to restore water supplies in 
times of armed conflict; 
b. explore ways to involve the private sector in helping, on a humanitarian 
basis, to restore complex water systems during armed conflict; 
c. raise awareness of the devastating effects of war on water supplies as well 
as on public health, at the intemational and national levels; 
d. prepare, in peacetime, for the predicted problems of water shortages and 
environmental degradation during armed conflict; 
e. call for measures to be taken to disseminate the rules goveming the 
protection of water supplies and installations, as well as to inform and to 
educate the public on water issues, in peacetime as well as wartime. 
With a view to finding further ways to improve implementation of existing law, the 
lntergovemmental Group of Experts for the protection of War Victims and the 26th 
lntemational Conference and Red Crescent invited the JCRC to prepare, with the 
assistance of experts representing various geographical regions and legal systems, and in 
consultation with experts from govemments and intemational organizations, a report on 
customary rules of intemational humanitarian law applicable in intemational and non~ 
intemational armed conflicts. At this stage, the main body of research for the report has 
been completed and consultations have been held with academic and govemmental 
experts. The ICRC is in the process of drawing up its final report to be ready in the spring 
of 2000. 184 This is an extremely important document, since it will contain a codification of 
the customary rules of intemational humanitarian law. The report will contain three 
elements, as well as an annex thereto containing a summary of collected state practice. 
The three elements of the report will be: 185 
182 ICRC (1994.1 ); ICRC (1994.2) 1 - 2. 
183 ICRC (1994.2) 1 -2. 
184 Henckaerts(1999) 1. 
185 Henckaerts (1999) 5. 
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a. A description of the methodology , including an explanation of how the 
customary law status of rules was established. 
b. The rules of international humanitarian law which were found to be 
customary together with a commentary, including an explanation as to why 
this conclusion was reached. 
c. As recommended by the experts consulted, an indication of trends in the 
development of customary international law where uncertainty exists whether 
a certain rule h~s already crystallised into customary international law. 
Also of great importance, is the outcome of the recent 27th International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent held from 31 October to 06 November 1999, in Geneva, 
Switzerland. During this international conference which was attended by delegates from 
most countries in the world, a Plan of Action was drafted and adopted by the members for 
the coming four years in order to, inter alia, improve the care and protection of victims of 
armed conflicts. Members will implement the actions set out in the Plan of Action in 
accordance with their respective powers, mandates and capacities. This Plan of Action has 
specific implications for the protection of the environment and water. The final goals of the 
Plan of Action are the following: 186 
a. "Full como/lance by all parties to an armed conflict with fbeir 
obligations under international humanitarian law to protect and assist 
the civilian population and other victims of the conflict and to !!fP!Ct 
protected objects." This is an important provision with regard to the 
protection of water during armed conflict, because sub-paragraph (g) 187 of 
the Plan states that "evel}l possible effort is made to provide the civilian 
population with all essential goods and services for its survival; rapid and 
unimpeded access to the civilian population is given to impartial 
humanitarian organisations .. . in order that they can provide assistance and 
protection to the population ... ". Water is essential to the survival of the 
civilian population and when access to water, or the installations essential for 
the provision of water are damaged or destroyed, this principle re-enforces 
the right of humanitarian aid workers to gain access to those civilians 
affected, or to do the necessary repair work to those installations. 
Paragraph 2188 under this goal is also of extreme importance in relation to 
the protection water during armed conflicts, since objects necessary for the . 
survival of the civilian population are protected. Paragraph 2 states that 
"States stress the provisions of international humanitarian law prohibiting the 
use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and on attacking, 
destroying, removing or rendering useless, for that purpose, objects 
186 ICRC (1999) 1 - 19. 
187 ICRC (1999) 4. 
188 ICRC (1999) 4. 
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indispensable to the survival of the civilian population." This goal re-affirms 
the principles as already discussed that water installations and water works, 
for example, are objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population. 
b. "An effective barrier against imounitv throuoh the combination of 
relevant international treaties and national laws concerning the 
repression of violations of inteFnational humanitarian law. and the 
examination of an equitable svstem of reparations." 
Paragraph 13189 under this goal, states that "States adopt the necessary 
implementing measures, in particular national legislation for the repression of 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and for the protection of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems." This is also of specific 
importance to the protection of the environment and objects indispensable 
for the survival of the civilian population, since attacks which cause 
widespread long-term damage to the environment as well as attacks against 
objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, such as water 
installations, water works, etc, when not used solely for military purposes, 
are considered as war crimes. 
c. "Integration by States, of their obligations under international 
humanitarian Jaw in relevant procedures and training. Promotion of this 
law among relevant persons and bodies." 
Paragraphs 16 and 17190 of this goal pta~ an obligation on states to 
examine their educational and training curricula to ensure that international 
humanitarian law is integrated in their training programmes for the security 
forces and relevant public servants. Furthermore, states must ensure that 
the rules of international humanitarian law are incorporated into the 
operational procedures of their security forces and applied by their forces 
when they are engaged in operations to which the rules apply. 
d. "Conformity of weaoons with international humanitarian law, the 
establishment of effective controls on the availability of arms and 
ammunition, and an end to the human tragedy caused by anti personnel 
landmines." This means inter alia the use of weapons which will not cause 
widespread, long-term damage to the environment. 
The 28th International Conference will evaluate the results achieved by the Plan of Action 
over the next four years.191 
189 ICRC (1999) 6. 
190 ICRC (1999) 7. 
191 ICRC (1999) 2. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOUTH AFRICA'S LEGAL POSITION IRQ THE LOAC 
NATIONAL LAW AND INTERNA TtONAL OBLIGA TtONS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The application of public international law, including the LOAC and the role of water during 
armed conflict, depends on the municipal law of the state concerned. This municipal law is, 
in the case of South Africa, found in the 1996 Constitution. 192 
However, before these provisions are discussed, it is imperative to analyse the relationship 
between national law and international obligations.193 As already stated, 194 a state cannot 
plead the provisions of its national law as a valid reason for violating international law. 
Conversely, a state cannot plead before an international court that its national law 
authorises it to do something which amounts to an unlawful international act. If a change in 
national law is required in order that a state may fulfil its international obligations, then the 
state is under an international duty to make that change, or otherwise mitigate its 
international responsibility. 
The use of international law in national courts is often explained in terms of the doctrines of 
incorporation (monism) and transformation (dualism). According to Dixon,195 under the 
doctrine of incorporation, a rule of international law becomes part of national law without 
the need for express adoption. The rule of international law is incorporated in national law 
simply because it is a rule of international law. This "automatic! adoption takes place 
unless there is a clear provision of national law, such as a statute or judicial decision, which 
precludes the use of the international law rule by the national courts. 
The doctrine of transformation (dualism), 196 on the other hand, stipulates that rules of 
international law do not become part of national law until they have been expressly adopted 
by the state. International law is not ipso facto part of national law. Therefore, a national 
court cannot apply a particular rule of international law until that particular rule has been 
deliberately "transformed' into national law in the appropriate manner, as by legislation. 
Consequently, international law and national law are kept separate by the state. According 
to Starke, 197 a strong trend towards the dualist view developed during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, partly as a result of philosophic doctrines emphasizing the sovereignty 
of the state-will, and partly as a result of the rise in modem states of legislatures with 
complete internal legal sovereignty. 
192 South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No 108 of 1996. Government Printer, 
Pretoria. 
193 Dixon (1990) 79-82. 
194 Supra at 21 - 22. 
195 Dixon (1990) 81 - 82; Booysen (1989) 62- 65; Starke 73- 74; Dugard (2000) 43. 
196 Dixon (1990) 82; Booysen (1989) 65; Starke (1989) 73; Dugard {2000) 43. 
197 Starke (1989) 72. 
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Under the doctrine of incorporation as discussed above, customary international law may 
form part of the law of a specific state. This means that unless there is a contrary statutory 
provision, rules of customary international law may be operative in the national legal 
system.198 
National courts could be authorized by their national law, for example the constitution, to 
apply substantive provisions of international law. 
1996 SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
LEGAL OBLIGA TrONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SERVICES 
The 1996 Constitution, contains very specific provisions regarding, for example, the legal 
obligations of the South African security services, the legal status of international 
agreements, the application of customary international law and international law. 
The legal basis on which international law operates in the South African security services is 
mainly derived from Chapter 11 of the 1996 Constitution. 
The South African security services are defined in Section 199(1) of the Constitution as 
being "a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence services 
established in terms of the Constitution." 
The following sections of Chapter 11 are very significant for the security services regarding 
certain legal obligations in respect of international law: 
a. Section 198(c). "National security must be pursued in compliance 
with the law, including international law." 
b. Section 199(5). "The security services must act, and must teach and 
require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and 
the law, including customary international law and agreements 
binding on the Republic." 
c. Section 200f2l. "The primary object of the defence force is to defend 
and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in 
accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international 
law regulating the use offorce." 
Since there are various references to international law in these sections as well as in other 
parts of the Constitution,199 it is important to establish the meaning of these phrases in 
relation to each other in order to determine the legal obligations of the South African 
security services. 
198 Dixon (1990) 92- 94 
199 For example Sections 232, 233, etc. 
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SECTION 198(c} 
As already stated/00 section 198(c) of the Constitution prescribes that "national security 
must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law." It is important to 
determine what the words "law" and "international law'' mean within the context of this 
section, as well in relation to the words "international law" as used in other parts of the 
Constitution. 
Meaning of the word "law''. It is proposed that the meaning of the word "law" is a generic 
term used in a broad sense to include South African municipal law, as well as international 
law. The use of the words "including international law" is a strong indication that the word 
"law" is used within a broad context. 
Following from the abovementioned, the next question is what is meant by the words 
"international law''. 
Meanina of the words "international law''. Stark.Ef01 has a very comprehensive definition 
of the term "international law'' which goes beyond the traditional definition of international 
law. This reflects the new developments of what international law is currently viewed as. 
He defines "international law'' as: 
"That body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which 
states feel themselves bound to observe, and therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with 
each other, and which includes also: 
a. The rules of law relating to the functioning of international institutions or organisations, their 
relations with each other, and their relations with states and individuals; and 
b. Certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-state entities so far as the rights or duties of 
such individuals and non-state entities are the concern of the international community. • 
In the South African Constitutional Court decision of Makwanyane and Another, 202 the 
Constitutional Court had to decide on the constitutionality of the death penalty. During the 
course of arguments presented to the Court, the Court was referred to the judgements of 
courts of various countries and international tribunals. In view thereof, the Court inter alia 
had to decide, what, in view of the provisions of Section 35(1)203 of the Interim 
200 Supra at 39. 
201 Starke (1989) 3. 
202 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
203 
"In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter, a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shaH, whert:~ applicable, have r&gard to pubHc 
international law applicable to the protection of the right entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law. n 
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Constitution204 (now Section 39 of the 1996 Constitution),205 constituted public international 
law, and what the Court's obligation was with regard to considering international and 
foreign comparative law. 
The Court stated that international and foreign authorities are of value, because they 
analyse arguments for and against the issues to be decided, and show how courts of other 
jurisdictions have dealt with those issues. 206 
The Court decided that within the context of Section 35(1), public international law would 
include non-binding, as well as binding law. The Court stated that both may be used under 
this section as tools of interpretation. Furthermore the Court said that international 
agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which 
the Bill of Rights can be evaluated and understood, and for that purpose decisions of 
tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on 
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights,207 etc., may provide guidance as to 
the correct interpretation thereof. The wording of section 39(1)(b} of the 1996 Constitution 
places a definite obligation on the Courts to consider internationallaw.208 Although section 
39( 1 ){b) states that international law must be considered when the Bill of Rights is 
interpreted, the application of international law by the national courts is not only restricted to 
these circumstances. This inference could be made when considering other sections of the 
Constitution which refers to international law. 
With regard to foreign case law, the Court stated that it was not bound by it and the 
obligation the Court had, was to "have regard' to such law.209 Section 39(1)(c) of the 1996 
Constitution states the Courts "may considet' foreign law. Important is that the Court also 
stated than when it deals with comparative law in interpreting our own Constitution, the 
Court has to consider our own legal system, history, circumstances, etc., and although 
204 South Africa. 1993. Constitution ofthe Republic of South Africa, No 200 of 1993. Government Printer, 
Pretoria. 
205 Section 39( 1 ) states as follows: 
fl1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law." 
206 Makwanyane supra on p 686 A. 
207 Makwanyane supra on p 686 E. 
206 
"Must consider international law." 
209 Makwanyane supra on 687 C - D. Also see Norlje and Another v Attorney General of the Cape and Another 
1995 (2) BCLR 236 (C) on p 247 A-0; Park-Ross and Another v The Director, Office for Serious Economic 
Offences 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) on p 208 C-F. 
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assistance could be derived from public international law and foreign case law, the Court is 
not bound to follow it. 210 
It is suggested that the Court, when referring to "non-binding law", also referred to so-called 
"soft /aw".211 
The Court's interpretation of binding law, includes- with reference to Dugard,212 - "all the 
sources of international law recognised by article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice". 213 
In view of the abovementioned, it would appear as if the words "international law" would 
include binding law, such as treaties binding on the Republic, customary international law 
principles, etc, as well as non-binding law, such as "soft law". 
SECTION 199(5) 
In contrast to section 198(c) of the Constitution as a bro~d guiding principle, section 199 
prescribes specific conduct required by the security services. Section 199(5)214 of the 
Constitution obliges the South African security forces to, inter alia, "act in accordance with 
the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international 
agreements binding on the Republic." It is therefore important to determine what some of 
these phrases mean. The meaning of the word "Constitution" is self-explanatory and does 
not need further explanation. The word "law" has also already been discussed above.215 
Meaning of the words "customary international laW'. The definition and requirements of 
customary international law have already been dealt wi~16 and needs no repetition. 
However, it is also important to discuss the status of customary international law within the 
context of South African municipal law. In this sense it is necessary to refer to section 232 
of the Constitution which reads as follows: 
"Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an 
Act of Parliament." 
210 Mak.wanyane supra on 687 G- 688 A. Also see Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1996(2) BCLR 232 
(W) on p 237 H. 
211 Supra at 20. 
212 Makwanyane supra on 686 n 46. 
213 Supra at 14 and n 64. 
214 Supra at 39. 
215 Supra at 40. 
216 Supra at 11 and 15 -17. 
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According to Dugard,217 for over a hundred years, the South African courts simply assumed 
that the rules and principles of customary international law might be applied by municipal 
courts as if they were in some way part of South African law. Therefore these courts 
showed a strong support for the monist approach (the doctrine of incorporation) in respect 
of customary intemationallaw.218 
Section 231(4) of the Interim Constitution of South Africa constitutionalized customary 
international law,219 thereby adopting the doctrine of transformation (dualism). This was 
followed by the provisions of Section 232 of the 1996 Constitution, as quoted above. 
According to Dugard, 220 the effect of this provision in the Constitution gives it additional 
weight. He states that customary international law is no longer subject to subordinate 
legislation and that only a provision of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament that is clearly 
inconsistent with customary international law will trump it. Dugard221 states that this is 
emphasized by section 233 of the 1996 Constitution222 and that common law rules and 
judicial decisions are now subordinate to customary international law as it is only the 
Constitution and Acts of Parliament that enjoy greater legal weight. He further argues223 
that the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be invoked as an obstacle to the application of a 
new rule of international law. 
Section 232 does not state which customary should be applied and how they are proved. 
Dugard rightly states224 that it will still be necessary to tum to judicial precedent to decide 
which rules of customary international law are to be applied and how they are to be proved. 
In the case of S v Petane225 the Court had to decide whether Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions was part of South African law. The accused in this matter argued that South 
Africa was bound by the provisions of this Protocol, since its provisions had been accepted 
by the international community, which acceptance had made the terms of Protocol I part of 
customary international law. The Court stated226 that: 
217 Dugard (2000) 47. 
218 See for example Nduli and Another v Minister of Justice and others 1978 ( 1) SA 893 (A). 
219 Section 231(4) states: "The rules of customary international law binding on the Republic, shall, unless 
inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, form part of the law of the Republic. • 
220 Dugard (2000) 51 -52. 
221 Dugard (2000) 52. 
222 Section 233 states: "When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation 
of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law. • 
223 Dugard (2000) 52. 
224 Dugard 52. 
225 1988(3) SA 51 (C). 
226 Seep 571. 
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"customary international law may in this way be created very quickly, but before it will be considered by 
our municipal law as being incorporated in to South African law the custom, whether created by usus 
and opinio iuris or only the latter, would at the least have to be widely accepted." 
Dugard227 argues that the approach taken in the abovementioned case, is the correct one, 
which is also agreed with. 
Meaning of the words "international agreement$'. According to Olivier,228 the term 
"international agreement' was taken over by the 1996 Constitution from the 1993 
counterpart. She states that the drafters at the time favoured this term as being inclusive 
rather than referring to specific kinds of agreements, such as treaties or conventions. This 
modem term was chosen in the Interim Constitution because it is the term preferred in 
modem state practice, as a generic term including treaties, conventions, protocols, 
exchange of notes, etc. 229 
Art 2 of the Vienna Convention does not contain a definition of "international agreemenr, 
although it contains a definition of "treatY'. 230 Olivier states231 that according to this 
definition, a treaty is but one form of international agreement and that the term 
"international agreement' appears to be much wider than what is traditionally understood 
under the term "treaty'. Olivier further refers to section 102 of the UN Charter which refers 
to both treaties and international agreements to be registered and published by the 
Secretariat and concludes that this supports the view that treaties and international 
agreements are not necessarily synonymous. 232 Olivier refers to Baxter, who suggests that 
the term "international agreement' be used in a much wider sense as comprehending all 
those norms of conduct which states or persons acting on behalf of states have subscribed 
to, without regard to their being binding or enforceable, or subject to an obligation of 
performance in good faith. 233 
Dugard on the other hand, differs from the abovementioned viewpoint 234 He states that 
terminology is not a determinant factor as to the character of an international agreement. 
What is important, is that the agreement be between states, in writing and that the state 
parties should intend it to be govemed by international law. Once these requirements are 
met an international agreement exists between the state parties. Dugard states that the 
227 Dugard (2000) 53. 
228 Olivier (1997) 65. 
229 Olivier (1993/1994) 5. 
230 Supra at 15 and n 69. 
231 Olivier (1997) 65. 
232 Olivier (1997} 65. 
233 Olivier (1997) 65. 
234 Dugard (2000) 59. 
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term international agreement used in section 231 of the Constitution is therefore 
synonymous with the word "treaty''. 235 The same analogy can therefore be applied to the 
use of the term "international agreement$' used in section 199(5) of the Constitution. 
Meaning of the words "binding on the Republic". In this sense, one has to establish 
whether the words "binding on the Republic" restrict the application of customary 
international law, or whether these words only regulate the application of international 
agreements. 
With regard to the status of customary international law, section 231(4} of the 1993 Interim 
Constitution contained the words "binding on the Republid'.236 These words have, 
however, been omitted from Section 232237 of the 1996 Constitution. According to 
Ougard,238 the word "binding" was dropped from the 1996 Constitution on the grounds that 
it was considered unnecessary and tautologous. 
If one examines the wording of Section 232 of the 1996 which deals specifically with 
customary international law, one could argue that if it was the intention of the legislature to 
restrict the application of customary international law only insofar it is binding on the 
Republic, section 232 would have contained words to that effect. Therefore the conclusion 
could be reached that the words "binding on the Republic! as used in section 199(5}, only 
relate to the application of international agreements and not customary international law. 
The opposite argument could be raised that the words "binding on the Republic! also 
applies to the words "customary international law': i.e. that the security services have a 
legal obligation to act in accordance with only those rules of customary international law 
which are binding on the Republic. The latter viewpoint is agreed with, because of the 
wording of the Interim Constitution in this regard, as well as the fact that it is trite law that 
not all rules of customary international law are binding on a state. It is a well-established 
principle that rules of customary international law persistently objected to by a state, are not 
binding on that state.239 
It is also interesting to note the specific order of the wording of section 199(5), i.e. the 
obligation of the security services to firstly comply with customary international law and then 
international agreements, especially if one considers that Article 38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ240 mentions international conventions first. 
235 Dugard (2000) 59. 
236 Supra n 219. 
237 Supra at 42. 
238 Dugard (2000) 54. 
239 Dugard (2000) 31; Botha (1992/1993) 47. 
240 Supra n 64. 
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Meaning of the words "international agreements binding on the Republic". The 
meaning of the words "international agreements" has already been discussed.241 The 
meaning of the whole phrase, however, has also to be interpreted within the context of 
section 231 of the 1996 Constitution. 
Section 231 of the Constitution contains the following principles: 
a. The national. executive242 must negotiate and sign all international 
agreements. 243 This provision relates to the adoption of new treaties. 
According to Devine,244 these two conditions are cumulative. He states that 
if in future treaties should be adopted at the international level but South 
Africa has not participated in their negotiation prior to their adoption, they will 
be considered 'old tre.aties'. The fact that the President signs the treaty after 
adoption and that it is later ratified by South Africa will not, according to 
Devine, alter its status as an 'old treaty. 
Devine further rightly proposes245 that in international law, signature of a 
treaty does not normally signify that the signatory became a party to that 
treaty. A state normally becomes a party to a treaty by means of ratification 
or accession. It is therefore quite clear that South Africa will not become a 
party to a treaty purely upon negotiation and signature of the President. This 
will only take place through ratification or accession. Certain other 
requirements as discussed hereunder should also be met. 
b. Any international agreement is only binding on the Republic once it has 
been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces. unless it is an agreement referred to 
subsection (3).246 If it is an international agreement of a technical. 
administrative or executive nature. or which does not require ratification 
or accession, approval by Parliament is not necessary. The only 
requirement is that it must be tabled in Parliament within a reasonable 
time. 247 Dugard248 states that the Interim Constitution stipulated that all 
241 Supra at 44 - 45. 
242 The executive authority of the Republic vests in the President as head of the national executive (Section 83), 
as well as the other members of Cabinet (Section 85) of the 1996 Constitution. 
243 Section 231 ( 1 ) of 1996 Constitution. 
244 Devine (1995) 4. 
245 Devine (1995) 4. 
246 Sect1on 231(2) of 1996 Constitution. 
247 Section 231(3) of 1996 Constitution. 
248 Dugard (2000) 56. 
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treaties signed by the executive were to be ratified by Parliament. 249 This 
provision did not take into account that most treaties are intended to come 
into operation immediately and that the ratification process is very 
cumbersome. The 1996 Constitution recognized this problem by exempting 
technical, administrative or executive agreements, or those who do not 
require ratification or accession, from Parliamentary approval. 
The problem is that the Constitution does not clarify what is meant by 
"technical, administrative or executive agreements". This, according to 
Ougard,250 could lead to disputes. Ougard argues251 that ultimately, it is a 
question of intention. Where parties intend that an agreement is to come 
into force immediately without ratification at the international level, it would 
be ridiculous for the South African Parliament to insist on parliamentary 
approval. 
Olivier52 states that the state law advisors understand these terms to refer to 
agreements of a routine nature, flowing from the daily activities of 
government departments. She further states that the approach suggested 
by the Office of the President, is that in the case of any doubt whether an 
agreement falls under section 231 {3), the longer parliamentary route should 
be followed. 253 
Botha points out that two possibilities exist ~arding the meaning of the 
words "technical, administrative or executive". The first is that each of 
them have a distinct meaning, each with an individual meaning and each 
constituting a separate sub-category. Alternately, the three terms may be 
read together as indicative of a single type or genus of treaty. 
However, the exact gocedure regarding ratification or accession, has also 
not been prescribed. 
c. An international agreement becomes law in the Republic when enacted 
into law by national legislation. A self-executing international agreement 
does not require incorporation into national law, but becomes law once 
Parliament has approved such self-executing provision. provided that 
such a provision is not inconsistent with the Constitution or the national 
249 Supra at 45. 
250 Dugard (2000) 56. 
251 Dugard (2000) 56. 
252 Olivier (1.997) 64. 
253 Also see Dugard (2000) 57. 
254 Botha (1997) 97- 98. 
255 Botha (1995) 198. 
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laws of the country. According to Dugard, 256 these provisions are bound to 
create some problems, since they introduce the concept of self-executing 
treaties into South African law. Dugard states that the question whether the 
provisions of a treaty are self-executing or not has troubled the American 
courts for years. 257 Dugard states, that in view of this Constitutional 
provision, South African courts will have to decide whether a treaty is self-
executing in the sense that existing law is adequate to enable the Republic 
to carry out its international obligations without legislative incorporation of the 
treaty. If not, and it is not self-executing, further legislation is required. 
According to Dugard, 258 no general guidelines can be given on this matter 
and each case will have to be decided on its own merits. 
Botha259 states that the adoption of section 231(4) confirmed the ruling in the 
locus classicus case of Pan American World Airlines case260 on the 
application of treaties within municipal law. 261 
d. International agreements which were binding on the Republic when the 
1996 Constitution took effect. remain binding on the Republic. 262 This 
provision means that all international agreements to which South Africa is a 
party and which were entered into before the 1996 Constitution came into 
force, remain binding on the Republic. According to Botha,263 in order to 
determine the abovementioned, it would be necessary to consider the 
provisions governing treaty conclusion both pre-1993 and under the Interim 
Constitution to determine whether the treaty under consideration was validly 
concluded or incorporated within its individual time-frame. Prior to 1993, the 
conclusion of a treaty was a so-called 'act of state' in which the individual, 
the courts or parliament had little, if any say. If, therefore, the treaty is one 
which was regarded as binding in terms of the then operating dispensation, it 
will remain so.264 If the situation arises that a treaty concluded prior to 1993 
256 Dugard (2000) 58. 
257 Dugard (2000) 58. 
258 Dugard (2000) 58. 
259 Botha (1997) 98- 99. 
260 Pan American World Airlines Incorporated v SA Rre & Accident Insurance Co Ud 1965 (3) SA 150(A). 
261 It was decided that: 
"[T]he conclusion of a treaty ... by the South African government with any other government is a executive and 
not a legislative act. As a general rule, the provisions of an international instrument so concluded, are not 
embodied in our law except by legislative process ... In the absence of any enactment giving (its] relevant 
provisions the force of law, [it] cannot affect the rights of the subject." 
262 Section 231(5) of 1996 Constitution. 
263 Botha (1997) 101. 
264 Botha (1997) 101. 
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is unacceptabt~. the treaty could be terminated according the termination 
route provided in the treaty itself, failing that, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties would have to be followed.265 
During the period 27 April to 04 February 1997, i.e. the timespan of the 
Interim Constitution, one has to consider whether the requirements for both 
international and municipal ratification have been met. In this regard, the 
requirements of sections 82(1)(i), 231(2) and 231(3) have to be 
considered. 266 
SECTION 200(2) 
As already stated, 267 section 200(2) of the Constitution requires the South African Defence 
Force, as a primary object, to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its 
people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating 
the use of force. 
Meaning of the words "principles of international law regulating the use of force." 
Firstly it should be emphasized that Section 200(2) of the Constitution relates to the ius ad 
bellum,268 i.e. the right of states to resort to war. The principal international law provision of 
relevance here is article 2(4) of the UN Charter.269 This principle is accepted as a rule of 
customary international law by the ICJ?70 Exceptions tq the use of force are self-defence 
(individually or collectively) or when authorized by the UN Security Council. 271 
To determine the meaning of section 200(2) of the Constitution, one also has to examine 
the provisions of section 227(2)(d) of the 19931nterim Constitution, which states: 
"The National Defence Force shall-
(d) not breach international customary law binding on the Republic relating to aggression;" 
The wording of the Interim Constitution with regard to the use of force, namely "relating to 
aggression" has been substituted in the final Constitution with "regulating the use of force". 
265 Botha (1997) 101. 
266 Botha (1997) 101. 
267 Supra at 39. 
268 See discussion at 5 supra. 
269 Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations." 
270 See Botha (199311994) 144. 
271 Section 51 of the UN Charter. 
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It is assumed, for purposes of this discussion, that the two phrases have the same 
meaning. 
Botha272 states that section 227(2)(d) of the Interim Constitution- and by analogy certainly 
section 200(2) of the final Constitution - raises difficult problems. He gives the example 
that where the President (or the government) orders the SANDF to invade or attack another 
state, or carry out a limited operation, it might be clear that this operation is contrary to 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter, since the case is not one of self-defence, or that no 
authorization from the security Council has been given. He argues that this order could 
appear to be unconstitutional and illegal. Furthermore, if the SANDF carries it out, they 
would be acting contrary to international law and also contrary to the Constitution. Botha 
quite correctly states that the prohibition on the aggressive use of force is one which mainly 
applies to governments and not to the armed forces.273 
It is true that the decision to resort to force, is usually a policy or political decision taken by 
government rather than an operational decision by the armed forces. Under the South 
African Constitution, the SANDF does not have the authority to make unilateral decisions 
regarding the use of force, because the utilization of the SANDF is subject to the authority 
of the national executive and Parliament.274 To complicate the matter even further, under 
section 199(6) of the 1996 Constitution, no member of the SANDF may obey a manifestly 
illegal order. This means that if the SANDF is given an order by the national executive to 
deploy and this order seems to be manifestly illegal in terms of international law, or 
otherwise, SANDF members could legally refuse to obey this order. 
One therefore agrees with Botha275 that it is rather peculiar to address the prohibition to the 
SAN OF and not the government which is ultimately responsible for deploying the SANDF. 
Botha276 states that since the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, it is difficult 
to imagine any legislation overriding the rules of customary international law relating to 
aggression and the use of force by states. He states that even if South Africa were not to 
become party to any of the treaties dealing with the use of force, the executive would still 
be bound by the supreme Constitution. 
Meaning of the word "force." Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use and threat 
of the use of force and is mainly applicable in international relations. According to 
Dugard,277 Article 2(4) does not exactly define which use of force is prohibited. Although 
the traditional view is that Article 2(4) prohibits the use of armed force alone, Dugard states 
272 Devine(1995.1) 185. 
273 Botha (19g311994) 186. 
274 See for example sections 198(d); 202(1) &(2), 203 of the 1996 Constitution. 
275 Botha (1993/1994) 186. 
276 Botha (1993/94) 144. 
277 Dugard (2000) 414. 
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that there is support for the view that this prohibition also includes the use of economic 
force,278 e.g. sanctions, or the use of indirect force,279 e.g. if state A gives active support to 
rebels of state 8, such as by permitting them to establish bases in its territory for attacks on 
state B, state A makes itself a party to the unlawful use of force. 
HAS THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE SURVIVED THE CONSTITUTION? 
Dugard280 states that the executive is responsible for the conduct of South Africa's foreign 
relations and in the exercise of this function it will frequently make decisions on subjects 
governed by international law. These include, for example, the recognition of a foreign 
state or government, the recognition of territorial acquisitions by another state, the 
commencement or termination of a state of war with another country, whether or not a 
person is entitled to diplomatic status, whether any person is to be regarded as head of 
state or government of a foreign state. Dugard states281 that it is undesirable that different 
organs of state should pronounce on the same subject, especially if their assessment of the 
legal implications of the matter should differ. In the English case of Government of the 
Republic of Spain v SS "Arantzazu Mendl, 282 it was stated that 'our state cannot speak with two 
voices . . . the judiciary saying one thing, the executive another. 
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, the courts have deferred to the judgement of the 
executive on certain acts of facts of state. 283 The judgement of the executive is generally 
given in an executive certificate handed in to court. In this way the executive in effect 
seeks to usurp the power of a municipal court to apf!IY rules of customary international law 
to a particular factual situation that comes before it. 2 
Before 1994, the application of international law in South Africa was subject to 
constitutional rules and prerogatives mainly derived from the English law.285 According to 
Botha,286 under the pre-constitution dispensation, the act of state, ruled with full force in the 
conduct of the country's international relations.287 This doctrine was also mainly derived 
278 Dugard (2000) 414. 
279 Dugard (2000) 415. 
280 Dugard (2000) 64-67. 
281 Dugard (2000) 64 - 65. 
282 1939 AC at 264. 
283 Dugard (2000) 65. 
284 Dugard (2000) 65. 
285 Dugard (2000) 67. 
286 Botha (1999) 331. 
287 See for example Beckmann v Minister of Interior 1962 (2) SA 233 (E) on 240; Attorney-Genera/ v Og 
Keyser's Royal Hote/1920 AC 508 (Hl) on 539, 576. 
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from the English law.288 When a court was required to decide on the continued existence 
of a treaty within South African law, this was acknowledged to be an area on which the 
executive was best equipped to speak. 289 
In the case of Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa,290 the Court had to 
decide inter alia, whether it accepted an executive certificate from the Minister of Justice 
declaring that there was no extradition agreement between South Africa and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The Court, however, declined to accept the Minister's certificate 
binding upon it and made its own determination of the question of customary international 
law before it. 291 
The question, therefore is whether, the so-called "act of state" doctrine has survived the 
new constitutional dispensation, or as Botha asks, 292 
"is there still an area where it can be said that the wiH of the executive is not open to judicial scrutiny?" 
This question is of particular importance if one considers that in terms of the final 
Constitution, customary law is part of South African law.293 
There seems to be a difference of opinion in this regard. According to Dugard,294 
"the continued validity of these powers, sometimes described as prerogative powers, is highly 
questionable." 
Booysen, 295 states that: 
"the basic question is whether the act of government is an exercise of the power to conduct foreign 
affairs. If the act concerns direct relations with another state, it is an unjusticiab/e act of state. A 
typical example would be the conclusion of a treaty." 
Booysen therefore concludes296 that the prerogative in foreign affairs and the concomitant 
exercise of the prerogative, the act of state, have not survived the Constitution unscathed. 
The courts retain their former jurisdiction to determine whether or not an act is an act of 
288 See Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade 1977 AllER 182 (CA). 
289 Botha (1999) 331. 
290 1998(2) SA 1011 (C); Dugard (2000) 65- 66. 
291 Dugard (2000) 67. 
292 Botha (1999) 333. 
293 Section 232 supra at 42. 
294 Dugard (2000) 66. 
295 Booysen (1995) 189- 190. 
296 Booysen (1995) 196. 
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state, but what has changed, is that the absolute discretion which the executive previously 
enjoyed within the confines of the prerogative power, has now been subjected to 
international law. According to Booysen, it is, however, a different situation where the act 
concerns an individual. On 196, Booysen further states: 
"If acts are primarily aimed at individuals they wHI be justiciable." 
Carpente~7 concludes that: 
" ... those prerogatives that qualify as acts of state in foreign affairs and which were part of our law 
before 1994 (such as the power to recognise foreign governments), remain in existence provided that 
they are not inconsistent with the terms of the constitution. Furthermore, the exercise of such acts of 
state is not subject to judicial scrutiny, in accordance with the dOctrine of separation of powers." 
Dugard298 refers to an interesting decision of Swissborough Diamond Mines (pty) Ltd v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa299 where the applicant, a company registered in 
Lesotho, but controlled by South African shareholders, sought to obtain discovery of 
documents relating to an alleged conspiracy between the South African and Lesotho 
governments to dispossess the applicant of its rights to diamond leases in Lesotho. Wrth 
no mention of South Africa's constitutional rules, the Court found that the 'true agreement 
between South Africa and Lesotho was non-justiciable. The Court found that the 
relationship between South Africa and Lesotho 'belonged to 'international law' and was 
'not an area for the judicial branch of government and was therefore 'a matter in respect 
which this court should exercise judicial restraint.' 
In view of all the abovementioned, it seems that the new Constitutional dispensation has 
brought about recognition of the fact that at least some acts of state are justiciable and that 
certain acts of state are subject to judicial scrutiny. This is a positive development away 
from the traditional approach that acts of state are non-justiciable. However, it also 
appears that there is a viewpoint certain acts of state are non-justiciable. It will be up to the 
courts in future to clarify this judicial uncertainty. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENCE AND 
HUMANITARIAN LAWS OF WAR 
It is well established by now that there is a very clear distinction in the LOAC between the 
ius in bello and the ius ad bellum. 300 Devine301 states that the entire LOAC must now be 
297 Carpenter (1997) 111. President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). In this 
case, the Court decided that, with reference to section 82 of the Interim Constitution and section 84 of the 1996 
constitution, that while the powers enumerated in section 82(1) undoubtedly had their origin in the royal 
prerogative, the President has no powers derived from prerogative other than those expressly enumerated in 
that provisions (par 8, 7140-E). 
298 Dugard (2000) 70. 
299 1999 (2) SA 279 (T). 
300 Supra at 5. 
301 Devine (1995) 187- 188. 
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considered in the light of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Which prohibits the aggressive use 
of force. He states that in the aftermath of Article 2(4), it appears that the LOAC continue 
to apply in hostile situations. They do not contravene Article 2(4), because they impose 
restrictions on belligerent conduct in the interest of humanity and civilization. This is not so 
for the ius ad bellum, since these rules authorize belligerents to take positive action aimed 
at overcoming an enemy. They will, therefore usually go beyond the bOunds of self-
defence. According to Botha, it is for this reason that reliance on them in hostile situations 
may no longer be iry accordance with international law. 
Botha further states at 188 that: "It follows that if the reliance on traditional rules of war is to 
be legal, it must be possible to bring the conduct of states relying on them within the ambit 
of the principle of self-defence." This is respectfully submitted to be too restrictive an 
approach. The LOAC does not only apply during a situation of self-defence, seeing that 
some LOAC principles also apply during internal armed conflict, such as a civil war. 
DISCUSSION 
From the abovementioned, it is evident that the legal obligations of the South African 
security forces are primarily regulated by the provisions of Chapter 11 , of which the most 
important provisions are sections 198, 199, and 200. These sections however also contain 
words and phrases which are also to be found in other parts of the Constitution. In terms of 
the provisions in Chapter 11, the SANDF may not breach customary international law and 
international agreements binding on the Republic and must comply with the principles of 
international law regulating the use of force. 
The question is why are these phrases also specifically used in Chapter 11 when most of 
these principles are contained in other sections of the Constitution, for example sections 
231 (international agreements), 232 (customary international law), etc. Is the inclusion 
thereof in Chapter 11 superfluous, or was it included for a specific purpose? 
Booysen302 (although he refers to the Interim Constitution, the same arguments can be 
submitted iro the 1996 Constitution~ argues that the fact that these specific acts are 
specifically mentioned can be interpreted in two ways. He states that on the one hand, it 
could be argued that they are the exceptions to the non-justiciability of acts in foreign 
affairs. On the other hand, they are mentioned ex abundanti cautela. Booysen states that 
the latter argument is the more persuasive one, because to make the acts of the executive 
and the SANDF in armed conflict subject to legal rules is so important that it needs specific 
mention. This viewpoint can be supported. 
Booysen, however, states that the fact that the security forces are subject to international 
law does not necessarily imply that the courts have the function of enforcing such rules. 
This is true, because many of the international agreements/conventions applicable to 
armed conflict to which South Africa is a party, have not yet been incorporated into 
302 Booysen (1995) 35. 
303 Booysen (1997) 54. 
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municipal law. This means that the national courts are not in a position to enforce these 
agreements/conventions. 
Booysen also states304 that the fact that the security services are specifically required to act 
in terms of customary international law, means that this duty cannot be affected by ordinary 
legislation. It is a constitutional obligation which cannot be changed by an ordinary Act of 
parliament. 
From all the abovementioned, the question is how do these principles apply to the LOAC, 
and in particular to the protection of water. 
Regarding LOAC customary international law principles such as the prohibitions on 
indiscriminate attacks, attacking civilians or civilian property (which would include water 
installations, water supplies, etc.), unless the latter is solely used for military purposes, 
prohibition on the poisoning of water supplies, etc, it is clear that the SAN OF will be bound 
to adhere to these rules by virtue of the provisions of section 199(5)(customary 
international law), as well as section 232 of the Constitution. 
However, all these LOAC customary international law principles are also contained in 
treaties to which South Africa became a party before the 1996 Constitution took effect, e.g. 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, etc. 
Therefore these international agreements are, apart from customary international law, also 
binding on the SANDF by virtue of the provisions of section 199(5)(international 
agreements binding on the Republic) and section 231 (5) of the Constitution (international 
agreements binding on the Republic before the 1996 Constitution took effect). 
The legal significance of the abovementioned is, that although South Africa may not be a 
party to a specific treaty, it may still be bound by customary international law principles in 
terms of Section 232 of the Constitution. On the other hand, South Africa would be bound 
by international agreements which are binding on the Republic by virtue of the provisions of 
Section 231, although those agreements or parts thereof, may not constitute customary 
international law. It could also well be that customary international law principles are also 
embedded in certain treaties, which means that South Africa would be bound by both the 
provisions of Section 231 and 232 of the Constitution. 
As already stated, 305 the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the meaning of the words 
"international law'' in the Makwanyane case is also significant for the interpretation of these 
words in other sections of the Constitution. In practical terms it means that the unqualified 
meaning of the words "international law" as used in Section 39 of the Constitution, can also 
be applied to the unqualified use of the words "international law'' in Section 198{c) of the 
Constitution. 
It is submitted, that when the abovementioned rights are interpreted by the Court, the Court 
is, in terms of Section 39{1)(b) and {c) obliged to consider international law and may 
304 Booysen (1997) 54. 
305 Supra at 40 - 42. 
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consider foreign law. When considering international law, it would mean that the Court has 
to consider, for instance the LOAC international customary law principles, such as the 
prohibition on poisoning water supplies, attacks on civilians and civilian objects 
indispensable to their survival, indiscriminate attacks. Furthermore the Court could also 
take into consideration international treaties, such as Protocol I and II to the Geneva 
Conventions and soft law such as the Guidelines, 306 etc. 
CLASSIFICATION OF LOAC WATER RIGHTS 
In respect of the abovementioned discussion of the South African Constitution, it is 
imperative to establish what the legal status of the LOAC rules iro the protection of water 
during armed conflict in terms of the Constitution are and on which legal basis South Africa 
would be bound to these rules. In practical terms, it means the necessity to establish 
whether these rules are customary international law, treaty law, or soft law. 
Up to now, the following LOAC principles/rules related to the protection of the 
water/environment have been identified and discussed: 
a. Prohibition on warring parties to poison the water supplies of the 
adverse party. The Hague Convention IV of 1907 respecting the laws and 
customs of war on land is widely accepted as customary international law. 307 
Therefore South Africa would also be bound by it in terms of sections 
199(5)(customary international law) and 232(customary international Jaw) of 
the Constitution. 
b. The right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited. This rule is a general LOAC rule, but could also 
be applicable to the protection of water during armed conflict, e.g. water 
resources may not be poisoned, etc;:. Although this rule is a customary 
LOAC rule, it is also embedded in Article 35(1} of Protocol!. Protocol I was 
ratified before the 1996 Constitution took effect. Therefore South Africa 
would firstly be bound by virtue of sections 199(5}(international agreement 
binding on the Republic) and 231(5) (international agreement binding on the 
Republic) of the Constitution. Seeing that this rule is considered a 
customary LOAC rule, South Africa would also be bound by virtue of the 
prov1s1ons of sections 199(5)(customary international law) and 
232(custqmary international law} of th~ Constitution. 
c. Proportionality. The principle of proportionality is another basic principle of 
the LOAC, 308 and it clearly also finds application in protection of the 
environment during times of armed conflict. Although this rule is a 
306 Supra at 34. 
307 Kalshoven (1987) 18. 
308 Supra at 13. 
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customary LOAC rule,309 it is also embedded in, for example, Article 57 of 
Protocol I. Art 57(2)(a)(iii) for example states that there must be refrained 
from attack "if the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated." Protocol I was ratified before the 1996 Constitution 
took effect. Therefore South Africa would firstly be bound by virtue of 
sections 199(5)(international agreement binding on the Republic) and 231 (5) 
(international agreement binding on the Republic) of the Constitution. 
Seeing that this rule is also considered a customary LOAC rule, South Africa 
would also be bound by virtue of the provisions of sections 199(5)(customary 
international law) and 232(customary international law) of the Constitution. 
d. The prohibition to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended. or mav be expected, to cause widespread. long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment. This rule was not considered 
customary international law, because initially the environment was afforded 
little protection in terms of customary international law as well as treaty law. 
The environmental devastation caused by the Vietnam war was one of the 
main events which sparked international concern and action to take 
concerted action to protect the environment, which lead to the adoption inter 
alia of treaty law, such as the ENMOD Convention and Protocol I. 
e. 
f. 
The abovementioned rule was incorporated into Protocol I. 310 Protocol I was 
ratified before the 1996 Constitution took effect. Therefore South Africa 
would be bound by virtue of sections 199(5)(international agreement binding 
on the Republic) and 231(5) (international agreement binding on the 
Republic) of the Constitution. 
South Africa is not a party to the ENMOD Convention and would therefore 
not be bound by the provisions thereof. 
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment 
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection 
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which 
are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the 
population. The comments made in paragraph d above apply mutatis 
mutandis. 
Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are 
prohibitecl. The abovementioned rule was incorporated into Protocol I. 311 
309 Hague Rules Art 23(e) supra at 22. 
310 Article 35. 
311 Article 55(2). 
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Protocol I was ratified before the 1996 Constitution took effect. Therefore 
South Africa would be bound by virtue of sections 199(5)(international 
agreement binding on the Republic) and 231(5) (international agreement 
binding on the Republic) of the Constitution. 
g. The Martens clause, which states: "in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents 
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of 
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples. from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience." This rule is part of the Hague Convention IV of 1907 
respecting the laws and customs of war on land and is considered a 
customary LOAC rule. Therefore South Africa would be bound by it in terms 
of sections 199(5)(customary international law) and 232(customary 
international law) of the Constitution. 
h. Prohibition of the destruction of enemv property. Water may be part of 
either public or private property. Article 23(g) of the Hague Convention IV of 
1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on land states that it is 
forbidden to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction 




312 Article 54(2). 
313 Article 54(2). 
This is also considered to be a customary LOAC rule. Therefore South 
Africa would also be bound by it in terms of sections 199(5)(customary 
international law) and 232(customary international law) of the Constitution. 
Prohibition of the destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population. This rule is part of Protocol I. 312 Protocol I was 
ratified before the 1996 Constitution took effect. Therefore South Africa 
would be bound by virtue of sections 199(5)(international agreement binding 
on the Republic) and 231(5) (international agreement binding on the 
Republic) of the Constitution. 
Prohibition of attacks on works and installations containing dangerous 
forces. This rule is part of Protocol I. 313 Protocol I was ratified before the 
1996 Constitution took effect. Therefore South Africa would be bound by 
virtue of sections 199(5)(international agreement binding on the Republic) 
and 231(5) (international agreement binding on the Republic) of the 
Constitution. South Africa has ratified Protocol I and therefore would be 
bound by virtue of the provisions of Section 231 (5) of the Constitution. 
Water as an indispensable resource for the survival of protected 
persons. Article 54(2) of Protocol I . prohibits the attack on any object 
indispensable to the survival of the civillan population. This includes drinking 
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water installations, supplies and irrigation works. Protocol I was ratified 
before the 1996 Constitution took effect. Therefore South Africa would be 
bound by virtue of sections 199(5)(international agreement binding on the 
Republic) and 231(5) (international agreement binding on the Republic} of 
the Constitution. South Africa has ratified Protocol J and therefore would be 
bound by virtue of the provisions of Section 231(5} of the Constitution. 
Apart from the abovementioned, this is also considered to be a customary 
LOAC rule. Therefore South Africa would also be bound by it in terms of 
sections 199(5)(customary international law) and 232{customary 
international law) of the Constitution. It goes without saying that this rule is 
considered a customary LOAC rule. Therefore South Africa would be bound 
by virtue of the provisions of Section 232 of the Constitution. 
I. "Helsinki RuleS' of 1966. relating to the use of international waterways. 
are intended to prohibit the poisoning of water tssential for the health 
and survival of civilian populations or the act of making it unfit for 
human consumption. The prohibition on poisoning water has already been 
discussed and does not need repetition. As indicated, South Africa would be 
bound to this LOAC customary rule by virtue of the provisions of Section 232 
of the Constitution. The rest of the Helsinki Rules could be dassified as soft 
law, which means that they are not binding law, but in terms of the 
Makwanyane decision, are one of the sources of international which must be 
considered when the national Courts have to interpret the words 
"international law" as contemplated in inter alia Sections 39 and 198(c) of the 
Constitution. 
m. Plan of Action - 27th International Conference held in Geneva November 
1999. This is also an extremely important example of recently developed 
"soft law" which is considered one of the sources within the meaning of the 
words "international law" as used in Sections 39 and 198(c) of the 
Constitution. The comments made in paragraph regarding soft law apply 
mutatis mutandis. 314 
STATUS OF LOAC TREATIES IN SOUTH ARICAN MUNICIPAL LAW 
Currently no national legislation exists with regard to the LOAC treaties to which South 
Africa is a party. South Africa signed/ratified inter alia the undermentioned Conventions 
without reservations: 
a. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 1952. 
b. The 1977 Additional Protocol I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 
1995. 
c. The Chemical Weapons Convention in 1995. 
314 Supra at 15; 20- 21; 42. 
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d. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (the 
Convention, however, is not in force yet). 
The abovementioned are all international agreements Section 231 315 of the 1996 
Constitution deals with international agre~ments binding on the Republic. Section 231(4) 
inter alia states that an international agreement only becomes law when it is enacted into 
law by national leaislation. This is a clear example of the doctrine of transformation as 
discussed above. 31 With re~ard to the LOAC treaties, SA is bound by, for example, by the 
1949 Geneva Conventions,3 7 as well as Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,318 by virtue of the provisions of section 199(5) and 231(5) of the 1996 
Constitution. 
Since South Africa became a party to, for example, the Geneva Conventions in 1952, they 
would therefore be binding on South Africa internationally. However, they cannot be 
enforced in the national courts until they have been incorporated in the South African 
municipal law, unless these rules, or at least some of them, are considered customary 
international law. If so, they are part of the national laws of South Africa and must be 
applied by the national courts. 
In order to give effect to the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions in South African 
municipal law, the Department of Defence, in collaboration with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, is currently in the process of drafting the Geneva Conventions Bill. The aim of this 
Bill as described in the draft text is "To provide for the prevention and punishment of grave 
breaches and other breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith." 
With regard to the protection of water during armed conflict, this would mean, for example 
that those grave breaches as stated in inter alia Article 85 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions would be punishable under our national law, for example: 
a. Launchin~ an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian 
objects. 31 This would include, for example, attacks on water installations, 
water supplies, etc. 
315 Supra at 45 - 48. 
316 Supra at 38. 
317 Ratified in 1952. 
318 Both ratified in 1995. 
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b. Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous 
forces (e.g. dams, dykes) in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.320 
The ENMOD Convention321 has not been ratified by South Africa, although it has very 
important provisions regarding the protection of the environment during armed conflict. 
South Africa is therefore not bound by the ENMOD Convention. 
INDIVIDUAL PENAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A war crime is a serious and criminally punishable violation of international humanitarian 
law. In order for an act to be classified as a war crime, the existence of an armed conflict is 
essential. 322 In order for a crime to fall within international jurisdiction, it is not sufficient that 
it be perpetrated in a state where an armed conflict takes place, but a nexus must be 
established between the offence and the armed conflict. This, however, does not mean 
that the crime has to be committed at the exact time and place where active hostilities are 
under way. "The only question, to be determined in the circumstances of each individual 
case, is whether the offences wete closely telated to the armed conflict as a whole. "323 
State parties to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols are bound to take all possible 
measures to ensure their proper discharge of their obligations in time of armed conflict. 
Among these measures, one of the more important is the adoption of appropriate national 
rules on penal sanctions. South Africa as yet, does not have any national legislation in 
place to prosecute war crimes. 
Although causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment as such is 
not specified as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions324 or Protocol I, such acts may 
be part of a grave breach of other provisions. 325 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of certain breaches of 
international law, including those bearing on the environment in time of armed conflict, as 
320 Article 85(3)(c). 
321 Supra at 24. 
322 ICRC (1999) 45. 
323 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a.k.a. "Du/e": Opinion and Judgement, 7 May 1997, Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72, paragraph 573. 
324 See Article 50 of First Geneva Convention, Article 51 of Second Geneva Convention, Article 130 of Third 
Geneva Convention, Article 147 of Fourth Geneva Convention. 
325 See for example Article 85(3)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I "launching an indiscriminate attack 
affecting the eM/ian population or civt1ian oblects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of 
life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects"; Article 85(3Xc) "launching an attack against works or 
installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, 
injury to civilians, or damage to civilian obiects" (my emphasis). 
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well as the of the person ordering the commission of such acts, is of critical importance.326 
It is filTl'lly rooted in both customary and treaty law.327 
However, although the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols do not contain 
specific articles declaring environmental crimes war crimes, the newly developed Rome 
Statute328 has very clear stipulations regarding the environment. Of specific importance is 
the contents of Article 2 of the Rome Statute, which makes provision for the jurisdiction of 
the Court to try war crimes. Article 2 contains the definition of war crimes which are 
considered punishable. Of specific importance, is Article 8(2)(b)(iv) which deals specifically 
with the environment: 
"2. For the purpose of this Statute, 'war crimes' means: 
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack wiH cause incidental 
loss of fife or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment (my emphasis) which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overaU military advantage anticipated." 
Other provisions of the Statute could also be interpreted as giving protection to the 
environment, 329 civilians, civilian objects, objects indispensable for the civilian population, 
aid workers, etc.330 The Rome Statute, however, is not in force yet. 
326 ICRC (1993) 12. 
327 See for example the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 (supra) and the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions relating to grave breaches. 
328 Supra at 59. 
329 See for example Article 8(2)(b)(ii). "Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects 
which are not military objectives"; 
Article 8(2)(b)(iii). "Intentionally direct attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved 
in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
long are they entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict'~ 
Article 8(2)(b)(xiii). "Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war"; 
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Geneva Conventions. • 
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63 
ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE AND THE FUTURE331 
Centner states that the correlation between future wars and water is more complex than 
often assumed. While water has been used as a weapon over time, its potential as a 
casus belli is less directly evident. The interrelationship between the two has to be seen as 
part of a far more complex set of factors that reflect the ways that societies structure 
themselves and allocate their resources. 
However, it is a fact that if left unconstrained by effective tr~aties or international norms, 
environmental warfare witl play a much greater role in future armed conflicts.332 Historically, 
environmental warfare has been used intermittently, even sparingly. With military doctrines 
increasingly cognizant of environmental topics, it is possible that future war will see 
deliberately comprehensive, co-ordinated environmental attacks designed to achieve 
strategic goals. 
Considering historical precedence, environmental attacks are more likely during full-scale 
wars involving ethnic, religious or other differences where the distinctions between the 
antagonists are fundamental. This statement is particularly true in the Africa scenario. The 
threat of environmental or nuclear retaliation will dissuade some nations from using 
environmental warfare in total wars. The potential for collateral damage and unwanted 
side-effects, as well as international opinion, will dissuade industrialized nations from 
environmental attacks in limited conflicts. 
Based upon historical evidence, traditional attacks will continue against hydrologic facilities, 
crops and forests. Increases in population density, urbanization, and dam water capacity 
will make these forms of attack even more devastating. 
Funding agencies, such as the World Bank, will decline funding for potentially dangerous 
projects, such a large dams, without resolution of internal or regional conflicts. 
Information necessary to select appropriate environmental targets is readily available. 
Maps and public documents indicate the location of irrigation and hydroelectric dams. 
Computer databases and modern modelling techniques enable planners to predict more 
accurately the possible short-term effects of environmental attacks. However, accurate 
predictions of long-term effects, which may include massive collateral damage and 
unwanted cascading effects, remain beyond the capability of modelling techniques. 
The numbers of potential targets for environmental attack are enormous and increasing. 
There are approximately 20 nuclear waste-reprocessing plants in the world located in about 
a dozen countries, and more than 465 nuclear power facilities in over 25 countries. More 
Article 8(2){b)(xxvi). "Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the 
Geneva Conventions." 
331 Centner (1995) 25- 27. 
332 Centner (1995) 25- 27. 
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than 40 countries world-wide depend upon hydroelectric power for 50 percent or more of 
their electricity. The number of potentially dangerous dams, dykes, and irrigation systems 
is in the hundreds or more. 
NATIONAL DEFENCE VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CAN 
WE HAVE IT BOTH WAYS? 
Dycus333 poses an interesting question whether it is possible to maintain a strong national 
defence, even to win a war, while at the same time protecting the environment for future 
generations? 
In some countries, like the USA, the choice is not an either/or proposition. 334 Despite such 
resolve, it is not always easy to abandon bureaucratic habits developed over generations, 
or to change the way we have long thought about what is needed to defend the nation. 
We first have to recognize that environmental security is itself an important national 
interest, as well as international interest. 
Rhetoric must be coupled with action, however. Decision-makers at every level of the 
defence establishment have to be rewarded for their environmental sensitivity, just as they 
are for performance of their military missions. Military missions should be carried out in an 
environmentally responsible way. 
There surely will be occasions when environmental sacrifices are necessary. The 
challenge is to decide whether such sacrifices are really necessary and justified from a 
military perspective. The consequences of a wrong decision could be catastrophic. 
What is needed is a settled procedure for determining when we must choose between 
environmental protection and national defence. This procedure should include a clear 
articulation of the issues and evaluation of the stakes. It should describe who will be 
entrusted with fateful military decisions and how he or she will go about making them. 
Because the choices are apt to present themselves in times of urgency and stress, prior 
planning is necessary to lay the groundwork for decisions in a system of rules that will yield 
wise and, insofar as possible, predictable results. 
Sometimes it is assumed that the ordinary environmental laws do not apply to armed 
conflict or to other wartime activities of the military. This assumption seems to grow out of 
a belief that no legal constraints are tolerable when the fate of the nation hangs in the 
balance. Obviously there is no legal basis for this assumption and this view ignores the 
fact that the natural environment is itself a national, and international interest that should be 
protected. 
333 Dycus (1995) 2- 3. 
334 Dycus (1995) 2 - 3. Former Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney answered this way: "Defence and the 
environment is not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in this real world of serious 
defence threats and genuine environmental concerns. I want every command to be an environmental standard 
by which federal agencies are judged." Former president Bush even linked "environmental secun1y" with 
economic growth as a basic national security objective. 
65 
However, just bringing the defence community into full compliance with existing 
environmental laws is not all that is required. It will require changes in patterns of thinking 
and the concept of environmental protection must be embraced by all segments of our 
society, and not just the military. This statement is particularly true regarding the SANDF. 
Taking the history of South Africa into account, the SANDF played an instrumental part in 
the apartheid government's 'kragdadige' approach to international relations in the 1970s 
and 1980s, as accurately described by Botha.335 Botha states that the official approach to 
international law by South Africa was hostile and reactionary and the country's isolation had 
a profound effect on the teaching and practice of international law. The new political 
dispensation brought about a dramatic turnaround, especially regarding international law. 
Suddenly it became a constitutional imperative for the country to comply with international 
law and international agreements. 
This had a profound impact on the SANDF, requiring a sudden paradigm shift from the old 
to the new. Within a short period of time, South Africa signed/ratified several international 
conventions regarding the military. These conventions, as well as other international 
instruments and soft law regarding the environment, have a huge impact on the strategic 
and tactical doctrines of the SANDF, the full impact of which have most probably not yet 
been grasped. Protection of the environment by the SANDF during both peace time and 
armed conflict is an international law obligation. Much work has already been done by the 
SANDF regarding protection of the environment duriRg peace time. However, it is 
submitted that some work still needs to be done to determine the fun effect of, for example, 
the provisions of Protocol I regarding the protection of the environment during armed 
conflict. 
At the same time, existing national laws need clarification to remove any lingering doubts 
that they provide baseline environmental standards for defence activities. Amendments are 
also needed to make the laws clearly applicable to military actions abroad both in 
peacetime and during armed conflict. 
Despite political, legal, financial and technological challenges, there should be optimism 
that we can maintain a strong national defence that is also environmentally sound. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 
As already stated,336 the new political dispensation brought about a dramatic new role for 
the SANDF, necessitating changes in existing attitudes, perceptions, and doctrine. This 
also relates the SANDF's approach towards protection of the environment. 
According to the White Paper on Defence, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the 
SANDF are responsible for ensuring the exercise of proper ecological management and 
control of military properties. This is done in co-operation with other government 
departments and environmental organisations. 
335 Botha (1992/1993) 37. 
336 Supra at 64. 
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The environmental function aims to ensure the environmental sustainable management of 
military activities and facilities by foHowing an advanced and comprehensive approach of 
Military Integrated Management (MIEM) encapsulated by the phrase "GREEN 
SOLDIERING". The Department of Defence {"DoD") has recently adopted a 
comprehensive DoD Policy Statement on Defence Estates and Environmental 
Management. 
The following guiding principles for environmental management of defence estates in the 
DoD which were accepted, include inter alia the following: 
a. The handling of environmental matters should take place within the 
parameters of international, national and regional agreements, legislation 
and regulations, and should support national environmental objectives. 
b. The emphasis on environmental management should be on integrating 
environmental considerations in all military planning and activities which 
could have an impact on the environment. 
c. Every commanding officer is responsible to ensure that the activities which 
take place under his/her control are carried out in an environmentally 
responsible way. 
d. The military will have to accept responsibility for the environmental impacts 
of its activities over their entire life cycle. 
Furthermore the proposed DoD draft environmental policy states that (quoted verbatim): 
"The Department of Defence, shall, in compHance with the 
environmental obligations placed upon it by the Constitution, 
national and international regulatory provisions 
and within the constrairlts imposed from time to time 
by nature of its business, 
protect the environment through pro-active measures of 
Military Integrated Environmental Management; 
accept responsibHity for use of the environment entrusted to it; 
minimise the impacts of its operations on the environment 
by means of a programme of continual improvement; 
promote open communication on environmental issues to 
all interested and affected parties; 
train and motivate its members to regard environmental 
considerations as an integral and vital element of their day-to-day activities. • 
The abovementioned guidelines and policy statement on the environment are of significant 
importance, affirming th~ DoD's commitment to environmental protection. However, 
policies and plans are worthless unless they are put in practice. These should be in place 
for both peacetime and during armed conflict. In the LOAC context, it means full 
compliance by the SANDF with inter alia the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols 
67 
I and II to the Geneva Conventions. Of specific importance is compliance with Articles 35 
and 55 of Additional Protocol I, which specifically address the protection of the environment 
during armed conflict, which, as already stated on numerous occasions, includes the 
protection of water installations, water works, etc. 
Furthermore, it would require a legal review to establish which weapons in relation to 
Articles 35 and 55 of Protocol I, could cause "widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the environmenr, as well as a legal review of new weapons in terms of Article 36 of 
Protocol I to establish whether th~ use of these weapons would comply with the provisions 
of Protocol I. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental warfare is not new. Military forces have used methods encompassed by the 
term throughout most of recorded history. Environmental warfare exploits natural and man-
made environmentally sensitive targets to achieve specific military objectives. The 
deliberate destruction of forests, croplands, dams, rivers, canals and deliberate pollution 
that adversely effects enemy forces and populations are examples of environmental 
warfare. 
Operationally and tactically, environmental warfare can be used to support many types of 
military operation. Its effects may be either transient or long-term. 
During armed conflict, water sometimes becomes a target, or is even used as a means of 
warfare. Until the 1970s, the protection of the environment - especially the protection of 
water - enjoyed little legal protection under either customary international law or treaty law. 
Apart from the customary LOAC rule which prohibited poisoning of the enemy's water, no 
specific rules existed which specifically addressed environmental protection. Some 
customary LOAC rules, however, did afford some indirect protection to the environment, 
such as the principles contained in the 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg, Article 23 
paragraph 1(g),337 etc. 
The 1970s characterised an upsurge of environmental awareness world-wide. 
Governments, industries and citizens around the world became increasingly aware of 
environmental issues and the need to manage these issues effectively. This has 
subsequently led to increased public opinion and environmental legislation, resulting in a 
general increase in environmental awareness in the international defence arena. 
Threats to water are the same as threats to the environment. The same emphasis should 
be placed on the need to protect water against the polluting and destructive effects of 
armed conflict. 
The 1976 ENMOD Convention was the first treaty affording direct protection to the 
environment. Its application is, however, hampered by the fact that many countries have 
not yet ratified this Convention. 
337 Supra at 22. 
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Thereafter, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, have made an 
important contribution to the strengthening of the international rules intended to protect the 
environment in time of armed conflict. 
In either case, as long as water is a civilian object and indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population, warfare against, or by means of water, is totally incompatible with the 
principles and rules of humanitarian law, as discussed. The importance of the provisions 
concerned and the obligation to implement them effectively cannot be overemphasized. 
The establishment of the Rome Statute338 was the next major step to afford environmental 
protection by inter alia classifying wilful attacks against the environment as war crimes. 
The development of the environmental soft law applicable to armed conflict should also not 
be underestimated. In this regard the Helsinki Rules, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution No A/47/37 and the ICRC Plan of Action are major developments. In many 
instances these documents re-affirm some customary LOAC rules. In other instances they 
present guidance and direction to governments, which may evolve in the development of 
these principles into customary international law. The Helsinki Rules confirm the customary 
rule prohibiting poisoning of water, the UN Resolution No A/47137 shows a new tendency to 
prohibit any destruction of the environment which cannot be strictly justified by military 
ends, while the ICRC Plan of Action also urges member states to the Geneva Conventions 
to comply with international law, to respect civilians and civilian objects (which obviously 
include water installations, water works, etc), integration by states, of their obligations under 
international humanitarian law in relevant procedures and training, urging states to allow 
humanitarian repair work during armed conflict, and urging states to ensure that their 
weapons comply with international humanitarian law. 
However, the true significance of the laws for the preservation of the natural environment 
during armed conflict has yet to be fully grasped. Further studies must be undertaken on 
the national and international levels, taking into account not only recent experiences with 
attacks on the environment, but also the growing international concern and recognition for 
environmental protection. 
Protecting the environment during armed conflicts is a subject that today poses important 
questions to which effective and realistic answers must be found. Within the African 
context, where water is a very scarce commodity, the need for protection of water cannot 
be overemphasized. 
What we more frequently see on our television screens, are regional conflicts being fought 
all over the world. South Africa has already become part of some of these and will 
definitely become more and more involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
military operations, especially within the African regional context. The new constitutional 
dispensation suddenly brought about dramatic international legal obligations for the 
SANDF. Apart from other relevant provisions in the 1996 Constitution, Chapter 11 thereof 
specifically prescribes to the SANDF compliance with international law, international 
customary law and international agreements. 
338 Supra at 59; 62. 
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In view of the abovementioned, its is imperative that during military operations, the SANDF 
complies with the relevant legal obligations of national and international law regarding 
protection of the environment. In a few years time, only history will be the judge whether 
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